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This is a review of research on child labor in Sub-Saharan  Africa.  It focuses on child
labor taking place in the household and controlled  by relatives of the children since this is the
most extensive  form of child labor in African  countries.  It is also the form of child labor that
is  the  most  difficult  one  to  appraise  from  a  normative  point  of view.  Subtle  trade-offs
between  schooling,  leisure  and poverty  across  generations  may  be  involved.  Hence,  the
paper emphasises welfare  economics issues pertaining of child labor.
Another  feature  of  this  study  is  that  it  seeks  to  survey  not  only  the  economic
research, but also research from other social  sciences, particularly  social anthropology.  The
social anthropological  studies  deal with an aspect of child labor so far less adequately dealt
with by economists - the relationship  between their labor and their socialization;  how certain
types of labor and education may give rise to different preferences to the children as adults.
A  major,  but  tentative  conclusion  of this  survey  is  that  the  relationship  between
poverty and  child labor is less close than normally assumed in the policy debate.
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Introduction
Child  labor  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  is  the  most  extensive  in  the  world.  This  paper
surveys  recent  research  on the  subject.  It makes  clear that at least 95 percent  of this child
labor in Africa takes place  in private households.  The paper focuses  on situations  where the
children are controlled by their own family, a fonn of child labor that often is not considered
a major welfare issue at all.
Drawing on  established  welfare economics, the paper shows, nevertheless,  that there
are  a  number  of situations  where  there  are  reasons  for  concern.  The  most  important  is
whether children's work duties interfere  with their schooling.  The major statistical  analyses
of child labor in Sub-Saharan  Africa show clearly how important different  characteristics  of
the  household  are  in  determining  why  and  how  much  the  children  work:  the  presence  or
absence  of father  and  mother,  whether  the  mother  or  father  is  earning  income  for  the
household,  and  other  factors.  Before  going  into  the  welfare  issues  involved,  however,  the
paper sets forth what is known about the children's  labor activities;  that constitutes the main
part of the paper.
This  study shows that increasing  poverty  may not cause  the children to  labor more,
but may  instead  force  the  poorest  into  idleness  or into  increasing  efforts  to  maintain  the
household infrastructure because of lack of complementary inputs.
*A number of people  have  had  an  impact on  the  paper.  I would  first of all  like to acknowledge  the  support
given by the Social  Protection Unit of the World Bank,  in particular all the assistance  given by Bona Kim and
the important guidelines  for the work given by Zafiris Tzannatos.  Deborah  Styles edited the manuscript.  Other
World Bank  staff members  who contributed  are K. Basu, S. Canagarajah,  B.  Fredriksen,  B.  Grimsrud,  and A.
Kielland. Outside  comments  have  come  from Thomas  Weisner,  Department of Anthropology,  UCLA;  Erling
Barth,  Institute of Social  Research,  Oslo; and the participants  in the  "Jon Elster"  seminar  at the University of
Oslo. My regular employer, the Norwegian  Institute of International  Affairs,  granted me time off to complete
the paper. Although the subject was not in their normal  field of study, several colleagues  there also made useful
inputs, including M. Heiberg,  P.  B. Maurseth,  and A. Melchior.
3A prominent feature of the paper  is that it draws  on research from both social anthropology
and economics, thereby discovering points of difference and agreement. In economic models,
if fathers  withdraw  from  households  and  reduce  their  share  of  income  transferred,  an
economic household model may predict that the children, including the sons, will work more.
A  socialization  model  of  social  anthropology  may  predict  that  the  *withdrawing  will
influence the sons' role perceptions and make them work less.
The major conclusion of the paper is somewhat negative. Despite the research  already
done, it  still  is not  really clear whether  this  form of child  labor  is  a major issue,  for three
reasons:
1.  No  empirical  research  has  yet  been  published  that shows  with  certainty  how
children's  labor  is distributed across  and within  households.  It is thus not clear,  for
example,  whether African  Cinderellas  constitute  a  large  group,  or whether  labor  is
evenly spread.
2.  In the empirical  studies  the criteria  for a child participating  in the labor market
are so weakly set that they have not shown whether or how much labor interferes with
schooling.
3.  The macroeconomic  development  in many African countries is so uncertain that
it is not yet clear  whether any interference  with schooling will prove  harmful to the
child.
A  follow-up  paper  will  analyze  the smaller but  potentially  more  harmful  issue  of
children who are set loose from their families and work to survive.
Sub-Saharan Africa has a higher rate of child labor than the other major geographical
regions; according to ILO (Ashagrie  1998, 4) statistics, 41 percent of children between 5 and
14 years of age are registered as working, almost twice the Asian  rate. The ILO believes  80
million children  in that  age group are working  in Africa and that both the  number and  the
proportion are increasing.
Poverty appears to be the major explanation for child labor. Africa is the poorest
continent.  Within Africa the poorer regions have overall a higher incidence of child labor.
4Countries where a large share of children work are on average poor. Apparently the poorer
the country, the more child labor exists. This confirms the frequently held notion that child
labor is mainly explained by poverty. As Basu (1999) visualizes it, sending out their children
is the family's last resort for earning income. As soon as the family's income increases, the
children are withdrawn from the labor force.
The sample of African countries for which the ILO has child labor statistics,  shown in
figure  1, makes a positive correlation between the child labor participation rates and poverty
Figure 1. Child labor in Africa,  1995
2,300  - *  Zimbabwe
* Cameroon
1,800  - *  Ghana* Guinea
Cote d'Ivoire  * Senegal
v  *  CAF
1,300  -*  Benin
*Kenya
. *  Uganda
800  - * Zambia  * Nigeria  * Madagascat.  Niger *Burkina Faso
0  - *  Malwanzania  *  Mali
Mo  b9  Buhiopia  rundi
300
10  20  30  40  50  60
Percentage of children (age  10-14)  working
Source:  World Development Indicators database; World Bank  1995; ILO  1998.
5less clear: I countries  at the same  level of national income  have widely different  child labor
participation  rates,  and  countries  with  quite  similar  participation  rates  may  have  widely
different national income levels.
Why is poverty not such an important explanation of child labor in Sub-Saharan
Africa? One possibility is, of course,  that the data are extremely noisy. The clue might also
be sought in another direction, however.  The bulk of the child labor registered in Africa is
not wage labor, but labor performed in the household where the children live.
To a large extent,  the participation  rate at the  national level will reflect the share  of
total economic activities performed in the households.  On average,  that share is decreasing  as
national income is increasing,  but not uniformly. Figure 2 relates  child participation rates to
the share of the population  in the rural areas, since statistics on household production as such
are not available.
The  picture painted by figure 2  is closer to the heart  of the matter.  Countries with  a
large,  rural  household sector are on average  poor, but at given income  levels the household
sector  accounts  for  more  child  labor  than  any  other  ways  that  economic  activities  are
organized.
I ILO statistics on child labor are the only ones that cover enough countries to be used. Those statistics
are, however, based on a definition of child labor that is based on so little information that the outcome is likely
to be very misleading.  The families are asked whether their children have been working at least one hour during
the past week on any GDP-increasing activity. The number of children who  have done  so is then considered to
be part of the country's  labor  stock.  Their number  is  divided  by the  total number  of children to produce  the
child  labor  participation  rate. This paper uses that expression  when referring to the ILO numbers and the World
Bank  studies  that  apply the  same  definition.  The  definition  is  acceptable  for  studies  of formal-sector  labor
markets,  but for labor in the household  sector it becomes too weak  at the same time  as it defines  away much
work that  from the point  of view  of children  (and the  household)  is the  same  as  that  included.  Until  more
appropriate  statistics are  available,  the ILO measurements  are  likely to remain  a starting point  for the analysis,
as they will also be for this paper.  However, questions may be raised about the sampling procedures  applied, so
the statistics applied in this section must be regarded as tentative suggestions of questions to be raised.
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An important reason for both the high incidence  of child labor and the feeling that it is
not  such  a  serious  problem  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  is that  a  large  share  of all  economic
activities  takes  place  in  households.  Since  most  African  child  labor  is  performed  in  the
household, harmful labor conditions in sweatshops  are not the only problem in the child labor
issue:  intra-household  allocation  must also  be  considered.  What  determines  the  children's
labor  activities?  What  are  the  effects  of  these  activities  on  the  household's  economic
situation?  What  are  the  consequences  for  the  children  themselves?  Is children's  share  of
labor activities in some sense too large or, for that matter, too small? If so, in which sense?
This paper will survey the research that focuses on situations where the children have
close ties to a family to which it identifies.  That in all likelihood constitutes the major part of
child labor in African countries. The survey includes  not only the empirical  studies of child
labor in Sub-Saharan Africa, but also the general welfare  economic analyses of child labor in
households.
7A later  study  will  discuss  situations  where  children  are  responsible  for  their  own
economic  survival while they  are still  children.  This is a smaller, but more serious problem.
Like what happens to household models in general when the issue of divorce arises, the focus
must shift to intra-family bargaining.
Moreover,  research  must  address  problems  that  are not  traditional  for  economists,
problems  of changing family structures  that may have  greater economic  impact  on African
famnilies  than  on  families  elsewhere  because  of the  economic  significance  of household
production.  In particular, the effects on this form of child labor of changing family structures
are  likely to be significant and should be explored.  The same applies to the death of parents
or other guardians.  In an African  context  a reasonable  question to  ask is whether there  are
any  systematic  differences  between  patrilineal  and  matrilineal  family  systems.  In  areas  of
land  scarcity are  the children  sent away  at  too an  early age in  order to  somehow  fend  for
themselves,  making it easier for the parents to keep control of the land?2 Is the allocation of
labor tasks among the children fair across gender and age groups?
This  paper  will  focus  on  the  children's  welfare,  but  from  a  paternalist  and
modernization  point of view.  Going to  school may make a  large  fraction  of children  more
unhappy  and  frustrated  than most  normal  work  experiences  might  do,  reducing  their  self-
respect  and future work capabilities  in the process. From the child's point of view, choosing
between school and work will in many  instances mean abandoning school. Nevertheless, this
study considers  schooling a  given as a precondition  for preparing  children for working and
living in a modem market economy.  Such a transformation  is also considered desirable or at
least unavoidable.
Most  Africans,  including  their  governments,  accept  and  want this  transformation.
Discussion of child labor within Africa implicitly accepts these values, and this paper will do
so, too.  Their  acceptance  allows consideration  of child labor  as  harmful  for  the children's
welfare  in the long run if it strongly interferes with their  schooling, even though the children
themselves might feel happy to be released  from the series of defeats or drudgery that school
2 Child labor is an issue sometimes associated with economic conflicts between generations  inside the
household sector that have turned violent. That generational  conflict has been observed in the Rwanda massacre
(Andre and Platteau  1996) and in Sierra Leone.
8may represent to some. A somewhat optimistic view of the future economic  development of
the African countries is necessary.
Choice in most cases does not mean either school or work, but rather which mix of
school and work should be chosen. The welfare issue raised is mainly whether the blend
chosen tends to contain too much work.
A large part of the final answer to that question for Sub-Saharan Africa, and hence the
normative evaluation  of child labor, hinges not so much on micro considerations  of the type
of work  performed,  but  on the  whole  macroeconomic  development  in the  region.  Despite
this, the paper will not indulge in speculation about the macroeconomic  future, but will focus
on these micro considerations.
The Research
Very  little  research  addresses  children's  work directly.  This  is  true  even  in  social
anthropology,  a field that has studied African  communities  systematically  for more than 70
years. Precise,  empirically based knowledge  is in short supply,  even about some of the most
straightforward  issues  such  as the distribution of labor time  between boys  and girls  in the
different  countries  or in the different social groups and ecological habitats.  This necessitates
a certain amount of guessing or conjecture  supported by pieces  of information tangential  to
the major aims of the research that has given rise to them.3
Nevertheless,  valuable empirical  research has been taking place over the years. There
are basically two different sources of information. Some studies are based on large household
surveys,  mostly  analyzed  by  economists  and  demographers;  others  are  from  scattered
anthropological  work, often based on information  gained through participatory  observation.
Most of the exploration of child labor based on household surveys is fairly recent, while most
of the anthropological  work dates  to the  1970s  and  1980s.  The older  works, influenced  by
techniques  from  developmental  psychology,  focused  more  on  child-rearing  practices  and
problems.  In addition  there is a  smaller literature  focused on the extreme  groups of hunter-
3 The author is educated as an economist and cannot claim extensive knowledge of social
anthropology, so he might have missed several important contributions made by social anthropologists.  In
particular,  it proved impossible to go through the major classic monographs,  looking for the possible light they
might shed on child labor issues.
9gatherer  societies,  which,  despite  the  small  number  of  people  involved,  may  tell  some
interesting stories.
These  two  approaches  have  their  obvious  weaknesses  and  strengths.  The  major
problem of the anthropological  work is the question of how representative  each case study is.
It  is  difficult  to  be  sure  whether  the  results  of a  particular  study  apply  even  to  the  next
village.  The problem with the large quantitative  surveys is questions relating to the quality of
the  underlying  data.  Have  the  surveyors  done  their  work  honestly?  Are  the  respondents
answering  honestly?  After  all,  in  many  areas  of Africa  economic  -information  is  often
consciously  hidden  from  neighbors  and spouses.  Why be honest  in public  surveys?  So  far
they have  also  been too  summary about  what  children actually  do when they allocate  their
time. Ideally the two approaches  should be systematically combined, for example,  by having
a few social anthropologists  explore the situation in a few of the surveyed areas.  So far, this
has  apparently  not  been  done  in  child  labor  research  in  Africa.  This  paper  does  so  only
infornally,  questioning  some  of the  survey  results  by looking  at anthropological  literature
and vice versa.4
Quantitative  studies of child labor  in  Sub-Saharan Africa  are  quite recent.  The ILO
has carried  out  and  published  two  surveys  in  Africa,  one  in  Ghana,  the other  in  Senegal.
Although these surveys  were intended to focus on child labor, this work appears  less useful
than  expected.  The  report  from  the  surveys  (ILO  1996)  is  difficult  for  outsiders  to
understand,  so this study does not report much  from it. Although the drift of these numbers
appears reasonable,  their reliability is even more difficult to judge. At the time of writing the
ILO  is  directing  several  valuable  statistical  surveys  of child  labor  in  different  African
countries  implemented  by  these  countries'  own  central  bureaus  of  statistics.  UNDP  has
recently made the most detailed one yet made, with data from Benin, but the reports have not
been available to this author.5
4 Purists  from both disciplines  are, of course likely to remain skeptical.  A social  anthropologist  might
question the value of studying statistical  fantasies that exist only in terms of constructed averages;  an economist
will question  the value of research that does not follow  its  routines of logical  control,  research  that  may  tell
more about the whims of the researcher than about  its subject matter.
5 A few results are reported  in Kielland  (1999).
10The information about child labor participation in the living standard surveys initiated
by  the  World  Bank  is  naturally  less  detailed  because  it  is a  part  of surveys  that  mainly
address  other  issues.  However,  the basic  information  is  gained  through  surveys  that are  in
principle  replicable  and where the  sampling  methods  are transparent,  so the results  reached
may  be  representative.  In  addition  these  data make  it  easier  to  link  child  labor  to  other
economic and demographic  variables.
The  studies also  contain  some  data about  time allocation;  the most detailed published
are for Tanzania. However,  the measuring errors  for the children's time allocation appear to
be so large  that when they are reported  in the  following,  this should  be kept in mind.  This
survey is biased toward economics,  but has tried to locate the most important contributions  in
social anthropology and demography.
It  is  naive  to  compare  the  results  from  economics  and  social  anthropology  directly
without  to  some  degree  outlining  the major  theories  and  methods through  which  they  are
reached.  This  paper  will  focus  on  the  two  social  science  disciplines  of economics  and
anthropology.  The economics  part will  first  outline  the major analytical  models  considered
relevant,  with  their  observational  implications,  then  will  discuss  the  applied  econometric
work.
Social anthropology  seems less amenable to  any neat division  into analytical  models
and  empirical  research.  Here  there  are too  many  scattered  and  widely  different theoretical
approaches  to  make  it fruitful  to  outline  them  all  before  discussing  the  empirical  works,
which in some cases do not present any explicit theory at all.
This  is,  however,  not  intended  to  be  a  survey  of  the  methodological  problems
involved in the research. It will be issue oriented but will attempt to give a "feeling" of some
of the research problems involved.
What  is  child's  work  or  labor?  The  traditional  definition,  which  this  paper  will
follow,  in the policy  debates  about  child labor  distinguishes  between  a  mainly  descriptive
"work"  and a mainly normative  "labor", though there have been some recent  attempts to get
rid of the normative  one by Boyden and others.
One possible non-paternalistic  approach will then to apply the child's own subjective
feelings  in order to distinguish between work and play or work  and labor.  In the context  of
11the household it is not easy to say what the child himself or herself considers work, however.
A  small  girl's  taking  care  of a  baby  might  mean  that  stressful  conflict  solving  for  her
becomes  mixed  with joyful  play.  A  spoilt  child  may  consider  all  work  as  labor  while  a
heavily  exploited child may have adjusted to the situation an consider it all as normal work.
Child work constitutes those activities performed  by a child that contribute positively
either to  the output of a family  or a firn  or to the family's  public  goods  and that the  child
considers  as  involving  some  sacrifice.  Output  means  not  only  output  in  the  national
accounting  sense, but also the necessary  input to the family's consumption and maintenance
of its infrastructure.  Hence,  water collection for both humans and animals is defined as work,
though the  first does not contribute  to national  output in the traditional  national  accounting
sense.
Child labor means work performed by children who are too  young for the task in the
sense that by performing it they unduly reduce their present  economic welfare  or their future
income  earning  capabilities,  either  by  shrinking  their  future  external  choice  sets  or  by
reducing their own future individual productive  capabilities.
This  definition  is  not  meant  to  be  operational,  but  to  clarify.  Determination  of
whether some  piece of work is labor presupposes  knowledge of psychological  and economic
processes  that no  one even  under  ideal circumstances  can possess  before  many years  have
passed, and maybe not even then.6 In practice  studies must rely on registration of children's
activities that they make before the  age of 15  and sort out what counts  as being sufficiently
goal-directed  to count as work.  Then some rough estimates  must be made of which of those
should be considered harmful to the child or not.
Family-controlled  work means  that the children belong to a family that it identifies
with. If the children work as wage laborers and thus are monitored by non-family members,
they are still family-controlled if they share any cash they earn,  and have the right to return to
the family at any time in case of need. For example, Agarwal et al. (1994) describe a group
6  Child labor is defined here  following the language  conventions  in the  child  labor debate,  but not in
its ordinary  meaning.  It is difficult  to stick to artificial  use of language,  however.  Hence,  I will sometimes  use
"child  work"  and  "child  labor"  to  mean the  same and use  the expression  "harmful"  work or  labor instead  of
"labor."
12of girls in Ghana-the  "kayayoos"-who  do transport work  in the markets in Accra carrying
the  goods on their  heads.  They are mostly  from rural  areas and  work far away from home.
Nevertheless, they share their income, the family may locate them, and they may return home
at any time, and expect to do so when they have saved enough for eventually getting married
back home.  Their labor is family-controlled  even  though they  sleep  and eat far away from
home.Normally,  however, farnily-controlled  child  work is performed by children who live in
the family to which they belong, and their work will be monitored from there.7
Household Models
More than 90 percent of all child labor in Africa is managed  inside a family context. It
is then quite appropriate that so-called household models became the analytical  starting point
for economists'  discussions  of African  child labor. These models are quite general  and may
apply to child  labor anywhere.  To put it simply,  in these models a family utility function  is
maximized  under  an  income  and/or  production  function  restraint  and  a  time  budget
constraint.  One of the advantages  of these models is their great flexibility in this respect.  As
pointed out by Strauss and Thomas (1995),  they had immediate intellectual  roots in Japanese
agricultural economics  in the  1950s and Becker's work of the 1960s. The primary problem  in
an  agricultural  setting  was  to  study  the  behavior  of  farmers  when  production  and
consumption were  joined in  the  same  decision-making  unit,  when  there  were  markets  for
some  goods and  services  while  others were  missing  and  the goods  and  services  had to  be
internally supplied.
Becker's work of the  1960s  (summarized  in Becker  1981)  had modern  consumption
units in mind,  but he built into his models three features  that made  them interesting  in the
context of a  developing  country.  (1)  Consumption  needed  inputs  of goods  and  services to
reach the utility function.  (2) Households reared  children who also needed inputs to develop.
In  particular,  they  had  to  decide  how  much  education  to  invest  in  them.  (3)  A  family
consisted of several decision makers, making it necessary to make clear when it would
behave as a single decision-making  unit. In particular, the interaction between children and
7  In  fact,  one of the  major reasons  why  children  labor mostly  at home  is  precisely  the comparative
advantage for their households  in monitoring and teaching work.
13parents and between spouses needed to be specified.  These are  all issues that are even  more
important in developing  countries  than in the somewhat  old-fashioned  American  household
Becker  had  in  mind  because,  unlike households  in the  industrialized  world,  in most  poor
societies households are performing the largest share of regular production activities in terms
of employment.
Children's doing hard work  in the household was thus not a problem that Becker had
in  mind  when  he  discussed  the  quality  of children.  It was  rather  the  expense  of formal
schooling  and  the  investment  of the  adult's  time.  Rosenzweig  (1978;  Rosenzweig  and
Evenson,  1977) and Makhija  (1977) made early contributions  dealing with child labor  in an
analytical  way in the context of household models, both coming from the  Chicago tradition.
They  were,  however,  mainly  using  Indian  data.  As  the  number  of household  data  from
developing  countries increased,  household models were applied to analyze  them, and have to
a  large  extent  been  developed  through  this  research.  One  consequence  is  that  a  strong
interaction  has  taken  place  between  these  models'  development,  the  data  collection
procedures,  and the econometric  estimation problems.
Rosenzweig  (1981)  gave  an early estimation  of a household  model with child  labor
that  included  an  analytical  exploration  of a household  model.  He  mainly  studied  a model
with  labor markets  in all directions:  for men,  women,  boys,  and  girls,  each  with different
wage  rates.  Therefore  he did  not specify  their  work internal  to the  household,  but he did
single  out  the  children's  time  spent  at  school.  Since  wage  changes  would  generate  both
income  and substitution effects with different signs, the model could not in general predict,
for example, whether an increase in the wage rates for children would cause the child labor in
the  market  to  increase.  Nevertheless,  since  the  substitution  effect  was  positive,  and  the
income  from the children's wage  labor constituted  a small  share  of family  income,  on the
basis  of the  model  one  would expect  that an increase  in the  wage  rate  for children would
increase the supply of child labor.
Among the empirical  estimates from Rosenzweig's  sample from rural India that may
be useful  for  comparison  with the  household  research  from  African  samples,  the children
supplied  17  percent of total family time  in the  labor markets,  but their income  constituted
only 6 percent of family income. A  10 percent  increase in adult female wages would reduce
14the girls'  labor supply by 7-8 percent, but decrease the attendance rate at school for girls by 1
percent  and  for  boys  by  3.6-4.6  percent.  An  increase  of  fathers'  wages  increases  all
children's  school  attendance  rates  by  more  than  7  percent  and  reduces  the  boys'  labor
participation rate by 9 percent, but has almost no effect on the girls'  labor supply.8
This  Rosenzweig  specification  may  be  applicable  to  some  areas  of  Sub-Saharan
Africa too, but as he suggested, different household models  are likely to be more appropriate.
In particular,  Rosenzweig  himself believed  that missing markets  and  surplus  of land  may
make  an autarky  model  more relevant,  that  is  a  model  where  the  household  produces and
consumes  all  its own  goods  and  services.  This  probably  goes  too  far, but  there  are  other
options to adapt the basic household model to African institutional structures:
1.  Male adults are the only suppliers in the labor market (or suppliers of cash crop),
while  the  female  adults  and  the  children  produce  the  internally  supplied  consumer
goods.  The  children  divide  their  time  between  household  labor,  education,  and
leisure, the women between household work and leisure. The income and home-made
products  are  pooled,  and  the  household  centrally  managed-the  defining
characteristic  of the  household models.  In a  variation, the boys and adult men may
work on the cash crops, girls and women supply work for the non-cash goods.
2.  Male and  female adults are  suppliers in the labor  market, but the women  divide
their  time  between  cash  and  home  production-production  where  output  is
reconsumed  in the family-where  men are  not  involved.  The children  divide their
time between schooling and home production. All groups have some leisure.
3.  The households are managed by adult females who divide their time between the
labor  (or  cash  crop)  market-eventually  as  paid  work  for  their  husbands-home
production, and leisure. The children do as in the preceding  exarnple. The income of
the husband that  is transferred  to the  household  is considered exogenous.  This  is  a
way to  maintain the  simple  structure  of the  household  decision  making  and  at the
8 These  results  on schooling  are  somewhat  difficult  to interpret.  Maybe  it is  the  mother's task  to
monitor  whether the  children  attend  school,  and  the boys  have  a greater  propensity to  shirk.  Since the model
does not specify the household labor performed  by the children, the strong effects on the girl's labor supply are
likely to be caused by their substituting the mother's housework. Note that while these gender-related  outcomes
15same time recognize some of the distinctive aspects of much African family life. Note
that  in  this  case  an  economic  theory  of the  household  may  be easily  combined  by
sociological  mechanisms  at the  macro  level.  For  example,  the  spread of particular
versions  of "modernization" norms through some kind of contagion mechanism may
cause  adult men  to transfer  less income  to  their women and children.  For exanple,
there are indications of a negative shift in such income transfers in areas of Kenya. If
so, the women have to respond to it by changing their own and their children's  supply
of labor.
The choice of model obviously will have consequences  for what will happen with the
allocation of children's time if family  income changes.  For example,  situation 3, an increase
in female  and  male  cash  income  (if transferred  to the  household),  will  have  very  different
consequences  for schooling.  While  an increase  in male  (transferred)  income  should have  a
pure income effect and increase schooling and leisure for the children, the increase  of female
income will also have a substitution effect that is  likely to increase  the home productivity of
the children's labor, particularly for girls, that might mitigate the income  effect. In situation 2
an increase in male wages may contribute to a lower female supply in the market, which may
reduce the amount of child labor  in the household,  while the increase of female  wages  will
not have  this  effect as  long  as  males contribute  little to home  production.9 In the  situation
when boys'  and  men's labor are  close  substitutes,  an increase  in male labor supply should
release boys'  time for schooling,  adding to the income  effect,  while only the  income effect
would work for the girls.
So far, to my knowledge,  these gender aspects of the household  organization  are not
introduced explicitly in the theoreticalexplorations  of household production-, but they have
become parts of several  empirical  investigations.  Balsvik  (1995,1996)  and Kevane  (1998),
who do not explore  child labor, is an exception.
are interesting, they are difficult to explain  on the basis of this model, where all income is pooled and where the
only explicit differences  between them are their wage rates. The rest is buried in the common utility function.
9  The  statements  in  the text  are,  of course,  strong  and will,  inter alia,  need  assumptions  about  the
complementarity  and substitutability  of the different  types of labor in their own  and, eventually,  the cash crop
production. Note that  it is not only  a question  of technical  aspects  of the production,  but also a question  about
which tasks the different genders and age groups are allowed to do, the prevalent social norms.
16Ainsworth's Analysis  of Child Fostering
Ainsworth (1996)  presents  an  empirical  analysis of the  West  African  institution of
child fostering based on data from Cote d'Ivoire. 10 In this institution parents are sending their
children  from their originating  households  to some  more  or less closely  related ones where
they spend their time  and do their consumption.  It is a rather important  institution.  In Cote
d'Ivoire  more  than  20  percent  of the  children  live  away  from  home.  In  other  African
countries the rate is even higher, close to 35 percent in Liberia, for example (Serra, 1996).
Like so many other transactions where  families are involved, economic,  rule-abiding,
and  emotional  motives  are  intertwined.  Ainsworth  outlines  several,  including  conceivable
intergenerational  effects:  adults who  foster-in children to have an income option later in life,
people  who  foster-out  children  in  order  to  give  them  educational  possibilities.  In  her
theoretical  formulation,  however,  she  focuses  on a  short-run  household  production  model
that  is, in fact,  a variation of household  model  3. The  focus is on the child labor  aspect of
child fostering.  The  household  maximizes  its utility  over  market  goods, home  goods,  and
women's leisure and its own children,  who may or may not be present. Since it is a short-run
model, the stock of our children  is given.  The home goods are produced  with market goods,
adult females,  and the children's  labor power. The household's  own and fostered-in children
are  perfect  substitutes,  but only  the adult  females  eamn  cash  income.  No  market  for  child
labor exists,  so children can only be brought in through fostering, that is the children have to
be brought  into the household,  fed,  and  clothed at  fixed cost, the  same for the household's
own and fostered-in children.  The men's income is exogenous as in model 3 1  1
Since this model's demand  for child labor  is a net demand  for  fostered-in children
whose  leisure  time  is  not  included  in  the  household  welfare  function,  but  is  mainly
constrained through the costs of bringing in children compared with their productivity in the
production  of home  goods,  the effects of increased  income become  quite different  from the
number 3 model.  An increase  in both male  and female  wage income  will  now increase the
10  The article is based on a Ph.D. thesis published in 1990.
11  Ainsworth  herself emphasizes  the  child  labor aspect,  but not quite  as  much  as  this paper  does.
However,  it is correct to  include  Ainsworth's  analysis  of child fostering  in a survey of child  labor in Africa
because of the light it sheds on the children's labor situation in  the  many African  countries where the children
17demand for child  labor. In the case of male income, this result follows when the demand for
home goods is normal.  For women a decrease of labor input should reinforce the effect.  Note
that  this  is  contrary  to  what  is  commonly  expected-that  a  decrease  in  poverty  should
decrease  the demand for child  labor. If home  goods are normal goods and children's  leisure
(or schooling) is not included in the family welfare  function, child labor will not decrease  as
income nses.
An  increase  in the  number  of adult  males  in  the household  will  also  increase  the
demand for child labor (in the sense of fostered-in children),  while the increase  in the number
of females  should have an ambiguous  effect,  since  in this  case the supply of labor  in home
production increases at the same time as home production and income increase. 12
The empirical  analysis  is based  on the  1985  Cote d'lvoire Living  Standard  Survey
(CILSS),  one of the two  first of its  kind.13 The  sample  included  1,599 households,  among
which  were  3,110  children.  More  children  register  as  fostered-in  than  out,  24.3  percent
and 18.6 percent  respectively.  The major reason  for the  difference  is likely  to be an  under-
registration of children fostered-out.14
The  only  asymmetry  between  fostering-in  and  fostering-out  decisions  in  the
theoretical model is that the household's welfare  function only includes  its own children, not
the fostered-in.  This is in fact a very strong assumption,  since if true, around 20 percent  of
the children  in some African countries  live in households  where the heads of household  do
so  frequently  have  to migrate  across  households.  In addition the  analysis  is skillfully  done.  Her presentation
shows how much information  it is possible to wrest out of the household surveys initiated by the World Bank.
12  In her  own reading  of the model,  Ainsworth  claims that  an increase  in  the number of adults only
implies an  increase  in  the demand  for home  goods,  and therefore  an  increase  for child  labor. However,  the
asymmetric  role of men and women in her household model should imply that their impact  on the demand for
child  labor  should  be  different.  If girls'  and  women's  labor  are  complementary  in  most  of the  observed
variations of household members, more adult females  should also have unambiguous  effects on the demand for
child labor, however.
13  Similar  household  surveys  have  now  been  made  in  several  developing  countries.  They  are
characterized  by an exceptionally  broad range of questions, making it feasible to study empirically many of the
interactions  that  take  place  in  economies  based  on a  large  household  sector.  A  brief history  and  analytical
presentation is perhaps most accessible  in Deaton (1997).
14 According to her  definition,  a foster child  had to be away  from both parents in order to count as a
foster child.  When one of the parents was away, the child could  not be registered,  because  no information was
available  about whether the child was staying with that parent or not. This was unfortunate,  since it excluded the
families that may compose that subgroup  of households having the highest propensity to foster-out.  It is also in
the nature  of the household  survey method that measurement errors for people present are likely  to be less
than for the members who are  away.
18not care about them. The empirical analysis showed that the factors operating  are so different
that  a  separate  estimation  at  each  side  of  the  fostering  "market"  was  warranted.  The
explanation  of that may well be this unobservable  asymmetry  in the  household's  own  and
foster children included in the household's preferences.
In any case, Ainsworth estimates each side of the fostering "market" separately. A so-
called  two-limit  tobit  model  method  is  applied  to  the  fostering-out  since  the  dependent
variable,  which must be an integer,  is bounded  from  both above  and below.  In fostering-in
the  dependent  variable  is  only  bounded  from  below  and  a  regular-  tobit.  In  both  cases
maximum likelihood methods are used. The main results are as follows:
1.  Own children  and foster  children  of the  same  gender  are  clear  substitutes.  If a
household has a girl of its own in the age group 7-14, it is less likely to foster-in a girl
and, naturally,  more  likely to foster-out.  The same applies with boys,  but the effects
are  somewhat  weaker.  The  cross-effects  were  small,  except  that when  a household
had a  girl its tendency to foster-in a boy was almost as  strongly reduced  as when it
had a boy. 15
2.  An increased  number of both female and male adults in a household will increase
the  demand  for child  labor-fostering-in  increases  and  fostering-out  decreases  for
children of both genders. The effect is as strong for women as for men.16
3.  Income  had  a positive  and  significant  effect  on  fostering-in  of both  girls  and
boys, but only  a weak nonsignificant,  negative  effect for fostering-out  for boys, and
even  a positive one  for  girls.  It  is interesting  to  note  that the  income-elasticity  for
fostering-in  in urban areas was about 0.9 for girls, while it was 1.1  in rural areas,  but
somewhat lower for boys. That is, to the degree the foster institution simulates a labor
market  for domestic  child  labor,  an  increase  in  income  will  not reduce  it,  since  it
15  Since  the  stock  of children  has  a  negative  impact  on  both  the  fostering-in  and  fostering-out
decisions,  in the longer run, if the equations hold, a population growth that increases the share of children in the
age group 7-14 should reduce the extent of child fostering.
16  This  is  according  to Ainsworth's  but contrary  to this author's expectations.  The  effect might even
be somewhat  stronger  for women.  This observation  appears to indicate  that  the relationship  between  girls  and
women  portrays  a need  by each  woman to rule a  certain  number of girls.  Or, put somewhat  differently,  child
labor in African households needs adult women  as managers.
19increases the demand without significantly  reducing the supply at the income level of
Cote d'Ivoire in 1985.
4.  When  dummy  variables  for  five  ethnic  groups  were  introduced,  none  was
significant  except  the  fostering-out  for  Mande  boys,  who  were  less  likely  to  be
fostered-out.
5.  The cost of rearing children is, unlike the theoretical model,  not specified as  an
independent  variable  in  the  estimation  of either  the  fostering-in  or  fostering-out
equation,  but the  negative  shift of fostering-in  for the  Abidjan  area may have  been
caused by high child-keeping costs.
In addition to the estimation results, Ainsworth's  article contains descriptive  statistics
of considerable  interest.  While  they are  only  implicit  in  her model,  Cinderella  effects  are
clear in table 1.
Table  1. Percent of own  and fostered-in  children's (7-14 ) participation in different activities
Activity  Girls  Bo  s
Own child  Foster child  Own  child  Foster child  |
Housework  65.9  78.8  36.9  56.1
Family farm  17.7  23.8  17.7  26.3
Job  14.9  14.4  10.6  19.2
School enrollment  67.9  50.6  81.4  71.1
Source: Ainsworth (1996, table 1  -2).
Summing up, Ainsworth specifies a household model to explain child fostering.  Table
1 shows that fostering is, indeed, correlated  with child labor. A large part of her research has
dealt with the problem  of how to make  the model  amenable  to econometric  estimation  and
identify  the  separate  economic  forces  at  work.  While  education  and  better  consumption
baskets  for  the  children  may  be  one  motive  for  sending  children  away,  Ainsworth  found
these  forces  weak.  Rather  it  was  motives  associated  with children's  labor that  could  be
clearly identified.
20An Old Variation of Household Modeling:  Chayanov and African Child Labor
The  Russian  economist  A.  V.  Chayanov-writing  around  1920-was  an  important
source of inspiration for the household models sketched in the preceding.17 He developed his
theories on the basis of a mass of statistics relating to peasants'  households, and he believed
it was possible to uncover economic laws of motion for their type of economic adjustments
that  were  different  from the  ones that applied  for  capitalist firms  in a market environment.
The specific predictions that can be made will often be almost the opposite ones.
The  basic  ideas  Chayanov  developed  are  the  following.  Each  farm  has  a  target
income  or  production  per consuming  unit.  When  that  level  is  reached,  the  activity  in the
household  slackens.  The target income (consumption basket) is easier to reach if the fraction
of producers  divided  by the total  number of family members  is high.  Some rather obvious
implications  for the demand for child labor are: the demand  for child labor must hinge on the
demographic  composition of the family. When the number of small children or the number of
elderly  in the family  increases,  the  demand for child  labor  increases.  When the number  of
adults, or family income increases, the demand for children's work will decrease.
Translated  to  stylized  African  conditions,  if  adult  males  are  kept  outside  home
production,  and  the  home  production  behaved  as a  peasant  a la  Chayanov,  an  increased
number of males will imply more child labor, while more adult women will imply less. Since
fostering  is  now  possible,  increased  demand  for  child  labor  may  also  be  translated  to  a
fostering-in of children in age groups with a production/consumption  ratio above target and a
fostering-out  of the  younger  children  who  have  a production/consumption  ratio  below  the
target level, if any household  felt it could more  easily reach the target income  by changing
the family size rather than changing the amount of leisure.  This kind of behavior presupposes
either strong forces  toward equality  at the village level  or a kind of conception  of what the
sustainable rate of production is in the longer run for the household's  plots.
Serra (1996) attempts to translate these  ideas into an explicit model of child fostering
in West Africa.  She  assumes,  however, that  there  exists technical  complementarity  between
17 A  selection of his  writings  is translated  and  reissued  in Chayanov  (1966).  A collection  of articles
was published in Russian in  1927, a treatise  in German  in 1923:
2 1child  labor  and  adult  labor;  in  the  preceding  analysis  this  paper  implicitly  had  assumed
independence.  In Serra's understanding of the marginal productivity of children's labor there
are  two components,  the direct effects and the indirect positive effect of children's  labor on
the productivity of adult work. This means that the marginal productivity of the child efforts
increases when  the number of working  adults  increases.  This implies that a household  will
import  (or  export)  working  children  until  the per  capita  consumption  in  the  household  is
equal  to  the  marginal  productivity  of  the  children's  labor.  The  lower  the  average
consumption, the easier it may be to satisfy this condition.  18
Hence,  if the number of young  nonproducing  children and old  nonproducing  adults
increases, the household will tend to foster-in working children.  The same will apply to adult
males  if they  are  not included  as working  members  of the  household.  An  increase  in the
number of working adults will have two opposite effects:  the marginal  activity  of the child
labor will increase,  but so might the average rate of consumption.  An increase in the number
of working  children  will  decrease the  marginal  productivity of child  labor and increase  the
average rate of consumption. Hence the stock of working children will have a negative effect
on fostering-in decisions.  The area of application  for this model  is the circulation of working
children across poor households  in a nonmarket  setting.
Some  of these  implications  fit  rather  well  with  Ainsworth's  estimation  results.
However,  it is difficult  to reconcile  Serra's  ideas with Ainsworth's high Engel-elasticity  for
fostering-in  children  in the rural  areas.  This, together  with the theoretical  implausibility  of
some  of  the  arguments  for  target  average  consumption  rates,  gives  reason  for  some
skepticism. 19
Implicit Household Modeling-Some  Recent Empirical Work
18 Note how close this reasoning  is to the  standard  migration theories  of Arthur Lewis  and Harriss-
Todaro.  This  is  not  so  surprising  since  a  theory  of child  fostering  necessarily  implies  a  theory  of child
migration.
19 These  ideas will come  up in a different  setting when the paper considers the evidence brought in to
social anthropology, or rather  comparative  psychology,  by Munroe  (1984).  Note that the consumption  used in
Basu  and Van  (1998)  is  closely affiliated  with  the Chayanov approach  as a supply mechanism  of child  labor:
restricted role of maximization and supply only above a threshold average  income level.
22Child fostering is a neighboring phenomenon to child labor, but still is not child labor.
Several  of the  living  standard  surveys,  including  a  few  African  ones,  contain  data  about
children's  activities  above  the age of seven,  however,  including  their work activities.  They
have  recently  been used  in empirical  studies of child labor in an African context  in a more
direct manner by  World Bank economists.  The research has evidently been built around  the
short-run household models, but the  links are more indirect  since the structural  models have
not been specified.
Instead the researchers  have gone rather straight to the reduced forms and included a
number of exogenous characteristics of the children and of the household and a fairly large
number of variables of potential policy relevance,  such as distance to school. The
econometric problems have been quite substantial and have, naturally, received much of the
attention. Two works have applied data from Cote d'Ivoire,  Grootaert (1998) and Coulombe
(1998), both mainly based on the 1988  Cote d'Ivoire Living Standards  Survey (CILSS),  but
also going back to the 1985 survey, the one Ainsworth used. Another study from West Africa
is Canagarajah and Coulombe (1998) on Ghana.  World Bank researchers have also made a
study of the more urbanized Zambia (Nielsen,  1998) and the less urbanized  Tanzania (Mason
and Khandker,  1998).
Let  us  first  look  at  the  studies  from  Cote  d'Ivoire  and some  of their  descriptive
statistics.  Their definitions of the variables, which have to be based on the ones applied when
constructing  the  interviews  for  the  living  standard  survey  (CILSS),  are  important  to
understanding their results.  A child is defined as having participated  in the labor force if he
or she has worked  at least one hour in the past seven days in any economic  activity, that is
any activity that contributes  to  the GDP in the  country.  This definition  is reasonable  when
dealing  with  an organized  labor market  where even  one  hour's participation  presupposes  a
major commitment.  In the context where the children  may, for example,  drop in and out of
work on the fields at any moment, the definition is in a sense too weak and strongly exposed
to measurement errors.
Coulombe  checked  for  this  and  found  the  variable  more  telling  than  feared:  95
percent of the working  children  worked  more than  10  hours  a  week,  and two-thirds  were
laboring at least 30 hours a week.
23At the  sarne time the  definition of child  labor is too  narrow,  particularly  when  seen
from  a  child  welfare  point  of view,  in  excluding  household  work.  It excludes  even  such
demanding  tasks  as  fetching  water  and  firewood.20 One  of the  advantages  of the  living
standard  surveys  is that  the  children's  household  activities  are also  registered  and  may  be
dealt with, as they are in these recent child labor analyses.
Rates of schooling participation are measured in the same way as labor participation.
Since these involve  considerable  expense  on the part  of the household,  measurement  errors
here should be expected to be smaller. The descriptive statistics in Grootaert show that child
labor is,  indeed,  significant  in Cote d'Ivoire  (see  table  2).  The participation  rates  are  high,
particularly in rural areas.
Table 2. School  and work: Mutually exclusive  categories,  ages 7-14 Percent
Location  School  only  School  and  Work only  Home care or
work  idling  -
Urban  39.3  36.6  3.7  20.3
Rural  21.3  28.4  27.9  22.4
All  28.5  31.7  18.3  21.5
Source: Grootaert (1998, table 8).
a.  Grootaert  adds  the housework  and the  "do-nothing"  categories  since he  believes the  last is  a measurement
error.  I agree  that the error might be  larger than for some other  categories. Nevertheless  idling, particularly  for
boys, is also a significant  problem, particularly in very poor families,  so this category is not empty.
Furthermore,  the children's  workloads  are  fairly heavy.  Grootaert gives a portrait of
the  full-time  child  workers,  of which  almost  90  percent  live  in  the countryside.  Including
homework,  the  girls work  54.1  hours  a week  and the  boys 48.4 hours.  The average  age  is
fairly  high,  however,  because  Grootaert  includes  children  of age  17.  Even  including  the
group  of children  who both work  and  go  to  school, the  average  child's  work efforts  were
high.  In  1988  the average  number  of working  hours per week  for the  children  working  in
Cote  d'Ivoire  was  30.7  hours,  constituting  about  10  percent  of total  labor  supply  of the
20 Here the  statistical practice  goes further  than warranted from  the GDP  restraint. According to this,
fetching water for livestock, but not for the family, should be included. In  practice none is.
24country.  In addition, the children spent  12.1  hours on home care,21 that is, almost 43 hours of
work altogether in a week on average.  Coulombe (1998) got 46.6 hours for the same country
with the same data. When household  work was included, girls were found to be working five
hours more than boys per week.
Another  interesting  descriptive  statistic  that  appears  in  Grootaert  is  the  complex
association between poverty and  child labor across households  and over time. From  1985  to
1988 was a period of declining income in Cote d'  Ivoire due to a combination of worsening
terms of trade and  a structural  adjustment program  (see table 3). Overall, child labor in Cote
d'Ivoire appears to be associated with poverty.
Grootaert interprets these statistics to describe a "strong link between  child labor and poverty
and the fact that the poor increased the supply of child labor the most in the 1985-88 period,
in response to the economic recession"  (Grootaert 1998, 23-24).  While in several ways
Table 3. Children's labor (age 7-14) in Cote d'Ivoire, 1985 and 1988, according to
poverty level
1985  1988
Participation rate  Yearly hours  Participation rate  Yearly hours
Very poor  30.6  1,268  43.9  1,713
Mid-poor  26.8  956  21.9  1,475
Not poor  14.4  920  10.2  1,619
All  18.5  1,001  19.3  1,598
Source: Grootaert (1998).
convincing,  his  statistics give  reason for doubt on closer examination.  In Abidjan there was
almost no supply of child labor in any poverty class both before and after the income shock.
Abidjan should, presumably,  be one of the regions  with the most severe income shock.22 The
impression is  further weakened on consideration of the association  between  income and the
children's labor participation for the year 1988 only (see table 4).
21  In a developed country such as Denmark, the children do housework 1-2 hours a week,  2.17 hours
for girls, 0.28 for boys. Bonke (1998).
22 The number of observations here appears to be small.
25Table 4. School  and work among children aged 7-14 in Cite d'Ivoire, by income
quintiles Percent of per capita household income
Quintiles  School  only  Schooland  Work only  Home care and idling
work
1st  20.6  23.0  30.9  25.5
2nd  21.7  25.5  27.9  24.9
3rd  27.4  31.5  21.3  19.8
4th  24.7  1  38.5  17.1  19.8
5th  38.1  32.2  8.9  14.8
All  25.3  30.2  22.8  21.7
Source:  Grootaert (1998, table 9).
One way to interpret this table is to add the first two columns. These totals show how
the fraction of children who go to school rises rather steadily with income, from 43.6 percent
in the  lowest  to 76.3  percent  in the  highest  income  group. Not going  to school  defines  the
group of children who only work or do home care/idling; their share decreases  with income.
That is, poverty, but not child labor, may explain why the children are not going to school.  In
fact, the share of children who both work and go to school increases with income.
How to  explain that?  One  possibility worth  exploring  is that the poorest  may have
fewer  resources  by which they  may  gainfully  employ their  school-age  children  (less  good
land),  but  more  demanding  infrastructure  (longer  way  to  carry  water),  so there  will  be  a
tendency  for their children to  do either home  care  or idling.  In other words,  up to a certain
income level the increased marginal productivity of employing children will work against the
increased demand for schooling to make the demand for child labor rather flat or maybe even
rising with  income  until  the  higher  income  groups'  demand  for  more  intensive  education
dominates.
However, so much is going on at the same time in households  that it is possible to tell
too many  stories  on the  basis  of descriptive  statistics.  In  order to  disentangle  some of the
forces  at  work  and  to  check  whether  they  really  are  likely  to  be  systematic  factors  that
determine the extent of child labor in the households,  an application of proper  (interpretive)
statistical  methods  is necessary.  Here the battery  of methods  developed  by  econometricians
also  gives  a wide scope  for  choice,  a choice often  made  difficult  because  of the very  samne
development of methods that has also made researchers aware of the many pitfalls.
26Grootaert's approach is basically a reduced form approach in which a great number of
exogenous  variables are introduced to explain his few endogenous ones, which comprise the
probabilities  of any given  child  to belong  to the different  groups  described  in table 4.  The
exogenous  variables  include  a  number  of  child  characteristics  such  as  gender  and  age,
household  characteristics  such  as  gender,  age  of household  head and  education,  and  some
environmental  descriptors  such  as  rural  or  urban location,  distance  to  school,  and  so  on.
Grootaert  does  not  explore  the  significance  of the  foster  relationship  for the  allocation  of
children's  work  and  schooling,  however,  although  that  relation  does  not  seem  to  have
changed much from Ainsworth's to his sample.23
No  attempt  is  made  to derive  these probabilities  from  any  economic  theory of the
households. Nevertheless,  the estimation procedure  Grootaert applies,  a  so-called sequential
probit model that is carefully  crafted  to  avoid  some  important  statistical  inference  pitfalls,
assumes  a  couple  of  important  theoretical  ideas  about  the  typical  household's  decision
process:
-Altruistic  parents  start their  decision  sequence  by considering  the best alternative
for the child, that is the alternative  "go to school and not work."  It is an either-or choice,  so
the  rest  of  the  alternatives  are  lumped  together,  hence  a  probit  estimation  of  those
probabilities on the basis of all observations  in the sample is the appropriate  procedure.
-At the next decision point, the children who are in this group are thrown out of the
sample,  and the next best  alternative,  the (conditional)  probability of "both going to  school
and  work"  is  considered  against  all  the  remaining  alternatives.  That  probability  is  then
estimated.
-The procedure  is repeated  and the probability  of "only working" is estimated.  The
remainder  are  then  doing  home  care.  For  each  stage  the  value  of the  exogenous  impact
23  From Grootaert's  1988  data (table  5) it may look as if the extent of fostering was about the same as
in  1985:  26.6  percent  of the  children  (ages  0-17) were  living  away  from  home.  In  his  estimation  model
Grootaert  does not distinguish  between the family's own children and foster children and allocates both groups
to the household heads  where they are located.  In the table of estimated  parameters  he calls them "father"  and
"mother."
27parameters  is  estimated.24 A  realistic  aspect  of Grootaert's  statistical  design  is  that  he
separates the rural and urban children and estimates the parameters  separately for each group.
Despite the fact that Grootaert notes that fewer than 2 percent of the children work for
wages, he  considers the estimation procedures to catch the supply curve of child labor, while
it is obvious that the observations realized are a mix of supply and demand where the bulk of
both the demand and the supply concerns the household's own children.
Many  of the  results  are  nevertheless  interesting,  but  puzzling.  For  example,  the
employment  of the  "mother"  has  a  strong  positive  and  statistically -significant  effect  for
whether  a child living in an urban area will go to school  and not work, while  it will have  a
strong negative  (but not statistically significant) effect if that child is a girl.25 It will increase
the  probability  of the  child's  "only  working"  (not  significant)  while  it  decreases  (not
significant)  the probability of the girls'  "only working."  In rural areas the effect of mother's
employment  is small  (and  insignificant)  on  "only  schooling,"  while  it  increases  both the
probabilities  of children's  "only  working"  (not  significant)  and  the  girls'  "only  working"
(significant).
An  increase  in  the mother's  education  has  weak  negative  (insignificant)  effects  on
"only schooling" for children in urban areas, but positive (insignificant)  for urban girls. It has
negative effects on "only working"  (significant)  for children  in general while strong positive
(and  significant)  effects  for  girls'  "only  working."  In  rural  areas  more  education  for  the
mother works  positively (weak, but significant) for children's  "only schooling,"  while  it has
a stronger (still significant)  and negative  effect on girls' "only schooling."  The effects on the
probability of only working  are weak and insignificant. When interpreting these results one
should remember that "only working" in the context means "not only home care or idling."
24  As  indicated  in  the text,  the  realistic binary  choice  variable  here  should  be  "schooling  or not
schooling."  In  the  absence  of a labor market,  work  does not  have  this binary  character,  but is  more  like  a
continuous  variable.  If,  because  of all the zero  observations,  one should  nevertheless  consider  it binary,  there
should  be two  sequences.  Schooling,  then  work  and  not-working;  not-schooling  and  then  working  or not-
working, where home care should be included in work.
25  Grootaert  also  analyzes  the  data  with  a  method  that  he  considers  less  satisfying  from  an
econometric  point  of view,  a multinomial  logit framework.  Using this method  the negative  impact  on  girls'
education  of mothers'  employment  becomes  statistically  significant.  The  only  really  new  results  that  are
reached  by the multinomial  logit  method  are that  now  distance  to school  has  significant  negative  impact  on
28These  results may  indicate  real policy  dilemmas.  There  appears  to  be a  short-term
negative effect of women's  accumulation of human capital  in the countryside  at the expense
of their  daughters.  Furthermore,  women  in  urban  areas  who  are  employed  tend  to  have
children with less "schooling only," but in this case the effect is likely to be on boys.
In  general  the  characteristics  of the  "father"  appear to  have  overall  weaker  impact.
Fathers' education has weak, but significantly positive impact on "schooling only" and
schooling only and positive  effect on working only. If the distance increases to above five kilometers,  this effect
subsides. Coulombe  does not supply any explanation, but the effect of boarding schools is a likely candidate.
29negative  (insignificant  )  impact  on  "working  only"  in  urban  areas.  It  has  weak  positive
(nonsignificant)  effects  on  rural  children's  "only  schooling"  and  weak  (but  significant)
positive  effects  on  rural  girls'  "only  schooling."  Fathers'  employment  has  some  negative
effects  (insignificant)  on the urban children's  "schooling  only"  and  "working  only,"  but  a
positive  (insignificant)  effect  on  girls'  "schooling  only"  and  "working  only."  The  most
striking  result  is  for  the  rural  area,  where  fathers'  employment  has  a  strong  positive
(significant)  impact  on  "working  only"  for  children  in  general,  while  it  has  strong
(insignificant)  negative effect on girls'  "working only."
Altogether  these  results  appear  to  indicate  that  women's  and  girls'  work  are
complementary  inputs  when home-care  activities  are excluded  from the definition  of work.
The  same applies for adult males and boys. This has important  implications, for example, for
the consequences  of the impact of adult migration or deaths on the allocation of labor inside
the household.  It supports Ainsworth's  result that fostering-in demand  for children  increases
as the number of adult females in the household increases.
In one  sense  it  is obvious,  but the most striking result is the number of cases where
the  changes in the exogenous  variables have  opposite  effects  for the pressure on girls'  and
boys'  labor activities  and  schooling.  Gender-specific  social  norms somehow  must  strongly
influence the economic activities of the children chosen,  including their labor.
Grootaert operates  with a dummy  for being poor that has  a strong  (and significant)
negative  effect on both "schooling  only" and "working  only" in the urban areas, and a strong
negative  effect on "combined  schooling and work" (against the alternative  "no schooling and
either home care or working  only").  That is, it must be positively  associated  with home  care
or  idling.  In  rural  areas  the  poor  dummy  has  weak  negative  (insignificant)  effects  on
schooling  only,  a  fairly  strong  negative  (significant)  effect  on  working  only,  and  even
stronger  negative  effects  on  the  combined  schooling-work  alternative.  Altogether  these
results  support  the  interpretation  of the  descriptive  statistics  in table  4-that there  is  no
straight  cause  and  effect  from  poverty  to  child  labor  in the  African  household  economy.
Child labor needs some complementary input often missing among the very poor.
Coulombe (1998)  analyzes the  same data using  a third statistical  method, a bivariate
probit model where  schooling and labor participation  are the two simultaneously determined,
30endogenous binary variables on which the impact of a host of exogenous variables  is studied.
Also in this case the reduced forms are set up without any attempt to derive them. The impact
of a  large  number  of exogenous  variables  is  then  studied.  Many  of the  results  confirm
Grootaert's analysis.
However,  his  results  do  not  support  the  impression  of  strong  complementarity
between  labor  inputs  of children  and  adults  of the  same  gender.  For the  rural  areas  one
explanation  may  be  that  he  includes  land  size,  which  may  catch  some  of the  apparent
complementarity  of the  two  forms  of family  labor.  An  interesting  new  exogenous  factor
introduced  is  religion.  It  appears  to have  some  impact.  The  children  of both  Muslim  and
Christian parents  work  less than  the children  of traditional  animists.  The  Muslim  children
participate  less  in  schooling  than  the  Christian  children.  Another  new  point  is  that  while
sibling  effects  in  Grootaert's  exploration  are  weak,  here  they  become  quite  strong.  In
particular, having an older sister makes a child likely to work less and go more to school.26
Before Coulombe (1998), Canagarajah  and Coulombe (1997) had made a similar study
of  child  labor  and  schooling  in  Ghana  using  a  bivariate  probit  model  to  study  their
interaction.  While the countries are roughly on the same economic level, school participation
in Ghana is much higher than in Cote d'Ivoire, which influences the school-work interaction
for the children. The school system of Ghana is much less demanding.
In Ghana the effect of income (measured by total expenditure) on the children's work
becomes  even more questionable  (see table 5). Only the "schooling  only" and "no school no
work"  categories  are clearly  influenced  by income,  the  first  in  a positive,  the  second  in  a
negative  direction.  It is likely that the last category  contains the group of children  with the
lowest welfare  levels.
26 In  principle, and for policy  applications,  the  most important  result of Coulombe's  research  is the
strong estimated  negative correlation between  the  children's schooling and labor. Alas, it is difficult to believe
in  the significance  of this  correlation  because  of the  way  Coulombe  has treated  the  data  set.  Somehow,  the
group  of children who  both  do schooling  and  labor  is  practically  empty  in  his descriptive  statistics.  This  is
difficult to believe. Although Coulombe should be expected to have a smaller group than Grootaert since he, for
good reasons, deletes all  children who were  on vacation  when  surveyed, there should  still be a good number of
children who  do both. And while the share of children who combine  school  and work is likely to be smaller in
Cote d'Ivoire than in Ghana,  where the school system is less demanding,  the difference  is too large.
31Table 5. School and work of children aged 7-14 in Ghana, by expenditure quintiles
Percent
Expenditure  Work only  School  only  Work and  "Idling," non-  All
quintile  school  GDP work
Lowest (1)  13.1  46.4  15.5  24.9  100.0
2  6.8  54.1  21.7  17.3  100.0
3  10.5  53.8  18.6  17.1  100.0
4  8.7  55.2  19.2  17.0  100.0
Highest  5.7  64.6  19.1  10.6  100.0
Source: Canagarajah  and Coulombe (1997).
This impression is confirmed  in the results from the statistical  analysis, which found
an inverted U-shape of the impact of income on child labor participation rate, peaking around
a  number  just  below  median  income.  Independently,  and  based  only  on  theoretical
considerations,  Andvig (1997) suggested  an inverse U-shape for the realized amount of child
labor as a likely shape of the impact of income on child labor in farming areas.27
This does not imply that child labor performed  in households may not be a significant
child welfare  problem  in its own right,  and  related  to poverty,  but rather that the standard
definitions of child  labor are  unable to  catch it. The main reason  is that it does not include
activities  that  do  not  enhance  GDP.  In  poor  households  with  a  labor-demanding
infrastructure  most of the children's  work will consist of this kind of work-carrying  water,
fetching wood, and so on.
Comparing  the descriptive  statistics from Ghana  and Cote  d'Ivoire shows that while
the  children's  work  participation  ratio  around  1990  was  considerably  higher  in  Ghana
(around  28  percent  compared  with  20  percent  in  Cote  d'Ivoire)  the  average  time  spent
working among the children who  participated was much higher in Cote  d'Ivoire, in fact two
times as high. The hours spent on household work were roughly equal. Part of the difference
in  hours  worked  may  of course  be  explained  by  various  measurement  errors,  but that  is
probably  not  the  whole  story.  The  existence  of  such  differences  even  at  national  levels
strongly suggests that for comparing child labor problems across countries when household
3227  Ray (1999)  confirms  this lack  of association  between  poverty  and  child  labor for Peru,  while  he
finds  it for  Pakistan.  When  he  includes  domestic  work  in  the  child  labor variable,  the association  becomes
weaker for Pakistan.
33work is a significant  part of the problem, the ILO approach  of comparing participation  rates
only  is  much too  simplified.  Numbers  that indicate  the  overall mass  of child  labor and  its
distribution across children give a better result.
The  results  from the  inferential  part  of the  statistical  analysis  show that in  Ghana,
unlike the situation in Cote d'Ivoire,  the mother's education  affects her daughters'  education
positively.  The  existence  of a  female  head  of household  has  the  same  effect.  The  Ghana
study  supports  (weakly)  the  expected  siblings  effects.  If  the  father  is  present  in  the
household,  his children tend to work less and go to school more, while-the mother's presence
increases  both  schooling  and  work.  These  effects  are  fairly weak,  however.  These  results
may be explained either by evil stepfathers or by input complementarity  between the mother
and her offspring. If household work is not included in children's work participation,  there is
otherwise  no  indication  of  such  complementarity.  Including  household  work  gives  the
contrary  result  that  if the  number  of adult  females  in  the  household  increases,  the  work
participation  rates  for  the  children  decrease,  a  result  more  in  line  with  common-sense
expectations.
Religion  has an  effect also in the Ghana  sample, where  Muslim  parents  correspond
with increased  school and labor participation,  but by less than the Christian faiths.  Christian
beliefs  increased  both  school  and  labor participation  compared  with the traditional  animist
household  in rural  areas,  but reduced  labor participation  in towns.  Is this a  glimpse  of the
Protestant work ethic transplanted to the African countryside?
The crucial  part  of Canagarajah  and Coulombe's  method is that they may study the
effects of school and labor participation simultaneously.  Since both variables  are endogenous
they  may not  ask  whether child  labor causes  low  school  participation  rates,  but they may
point  to  exogenous  variables  that work  on  both,  for  example,  increasing  child  labor  and
decreasing  school  participation rates.  Furthermore,  they may estimate  the  correlation  in the
error terms to see whether there is an overall negative  covariation.  Such negative  covariation
was indeed  corroborated in most of their specifications,  but it was not very strong.
In  Tanzania  (Mason  and  Khandker  1998),  the  time  burden  of the  children's  work
appears to lie somewhere  between those of Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire.  The difference between
boys and girls is greater, however.  Assuming that the size of the age cohorts 7-9, 10-12,  and
3413-15 are  equal,  average working hours for children not in school  were 30.2 hours for boys
and  38.9  for girls in  1993.  This fits well with an  earlier sociological  study of Kenya where
the children's working time ranged from 35  to 50 hours per week (Kayongo-Male  and Walji
1984) when they were not going to school.
According  to  Mason  and  Khandker  (1998),  schoolchildren  in  the  area  studied  in
Tanzania  spend roughly the same time  on school and work together as the working children
spend on labor, which indicates that schooling,  from the household point of view, represents
a considerable  investment in unused child labor.  For each boy between the ages of 7 and 16
who attends  school,  the household  forgoes  on average  22.2 hours of work  a week and  for
each  girl  27.5  hours.  If the  children  themselves  are  indifferent  between  schoolwork  and
homework, their present welfare will hardly be reduced through this work.
It does,  however,  indicate  that  the  children  in  this  case are  not  willing  or able  to
substitute  much leisure  when trading between schooling  and labor. The descriptive  statistics
suggest  then  a  clear  negative  covariation  that  is  not  so  much  in  evidence  when  only
participation rates are  compared. No statistical test on their covariation is given in the paper,
however.28 In  an  earlier  study  from  Botswana  (Chernichovsky  et  al.  1985,  35),  Mueller
reports  that children  who  do  not go  to  school  report  more  leisure time than  children  who
attend school, about 6 percent more for boys and 10 percent more for girls.29
In Ethiopia research  has been done to explain  the low school  attendance  of children
there. When they were directly asked, rural students gave conflicts between  work and school
as the most important reason for dropping out of school  (World Bank 1998,  96). More than
30 percent of the parents polled responded that this was the first reason why their children
28 An interesting  study of such interaction  is in Ravallion and Wodon (1999), but the authors are using
Bangladesh  data,  which are not quite comparable because  they can assume competitive  markets for child labor.
They  study a kind of natural  experiment,  a food  for school  project that  increases the attractiveness  of school
compared with labor. It has, however,  an income effect that theoretically may increase the children's  leisure. In
that experiment,  the probability of going to school increased by 17 percent for boys and  16 percent for girls and
the  incidence  of child labor declined  by 4 percent  for boys and 2  percent  for girls.  In other words,  it has the
strongest effects on the group of "idling" children.
29  It  should  be  noted  that  the  share  of leisure  for girls,  particularly  for young  girls,  is  probably
seriously overestimated  and their working activities underestimated.  UNDP (1998)  reports the opposite results
for urban children  in Benin, while  for rural  children the results  are about the same  as for Tanzania,  that is, the
amount of leisure  is equal.
35never attended school, and almost 20 percent said that this was their second reason.  The low
school attendance  in the rural areas of Ethiopia makes the negative association of child labor
and schooling in African countries stand out more clearly.
It will be important,  not the least for policy purposes, to clarify whether the high child
labor  participation  rates  in  most  countries  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  go  together  with  low
substitution  elasticities  for children's  "leisure"  vs.  schooling  and  labor.  As  Ravallion  and
Wodon (1999)  pointed  out, only in this  case  is child  labor in itself likely to  cause poverty
traps and make increased  school attendance  difficult.  Otherwise other resource restraints  are
probably  the  cause  of vicious  circles  of poverty.  Given  the  task distribution  between  the
genders in most African  communities,  making  girls on average more busy, the possibility of
being stuck in poverty traps associated with child labor is more likely for females  if there is
indeed  lower  substitution  elasticity  for them with  their  shorter  leisure;  they may  have  less
inclination toward it.30
This section has reported on representative  empirical  analyses  of child labor in Sub-
Saharan Africa carried out by economists.  It has also presented some theoretical explanations
of child  labor  as directed  by households  that  are  applicable  in countries  where  household
production  is  important.  The  focus  has  been  not  on how  the  children  are  managed,  their
working conditions,  their love or hate of work, but on how much  or how many.  Few clues
have been given to whether this form of child labor is harmful or helpful to the children or to
the economies  as a whole. The data do not make it possible to ascertain whether the work is
harmful to the children, since they reveal next to nothing of their working conditions.
Welfare Economics  of Family-Controlled  Child Labor
Are children likely to work too much or too little when controlled  by their parents?
Until now, the question has only been  systematically  raised in a couple of papers  by Baland
and  Robinson  (1998a).31  Becker's  (1981)  study  on  the  welfare  economics  of  families
presents  points  of view  that are  also  relevant  to  the problem.  Of particular  interest  is  his
30  Canagarajah  and  Coulombe  (1998)  estimate  the  correlation  between  the  error  terms  in  their
bivariate probit model for schooling separately for boys and girls and find very little difference, however.
31  Their  papers  are to  be  published  in  a  condensed  and  somewhat  altered  version  in  Journal of
Political  Economy.
36analysis  of the  conditions  when  transfers  from  one  altruistic  member  of  a  family  were
sufficient  for the  family  to pool  income,  generate  Pareto-optimal  internal  allocations,  and
make  selfish members behave nicely (the "rotten kid" theorem).  Child labor is, however,  not
an issue  for Becker, but the question of how much education should be spent on the children
i.32
The setting of Baland and Robinson is rather  abstract.  Therefore  it is also applicable
to  African  conditions,  but  they  make  no  attempts  to  look at  children's  role  in  the  more
specific welfare economic problems of African family systems.33
A commitmentfailure
Baland and Robinson (1998a) analyze several situations where the household head is in
control and the children belong to the family network.  The basic framework is that decisions
of the parents  are made for two periods.  In the  first period the adults make  all  of them and
decide how much the children should  labor and consume.  In the  second period the children
have  also  become  decision makers and decide how they may dispose  of their income.  The
length of the period is fixed and defined by the time parents are in complete control. Outside
the family there  exists a productive  education  system where  children's time may be used as
an input in the first period, and the return of it will accrue to the children as human capital. It
makes them more productive in the second period.
The adults'  welfare  is a function of their consumption  in the two periods  and their
children's  welfare  in the  second period.  In the main model  the  children  do not  care  about
their parents'  welfare.  The labor offers of neither children nor adults influence  their welfare.
Since the children  have no leisure,  the only possibility to increase their income  above their
parents'  is by reducing their work when they are children.  Children's consumption in the first
period is given as a fixed cost and is not a matter of choice. No problem of shirking exists. If
32  He has  some  remarks  about the  advantages  of family  firms that  may  well also apply to children:
"The Rotten  Kid Theorem  indicates that the beneficiaries  are more likely to consider the firm's  interests  than
other employees and to refrain from  shirking,  theft, and other behavior detrimental  to the firm"  (Becker  1981,
195). These are also some of the reasons why households may prefer the work of their own children or children
within a shared authority structure  (extended families).
33  Economists have started  to question whether husband-wife  interaction may cause  inefficiencies  in
African agriculture,  however,  but the allocation  of the  children's labor has not yet been  brought into the plot.
See Balsvik (1995), Udry (1996), and Fafchamps (1998).
37the children  are not working,  they spend their time on  education.  As indicated  before,  that
increases their labor productivity in the second period.
Both the  children  and  their parents  are  working  in  the  same  technology  units  that
transform  their  labor  input  into  consumer  goods.  Production  has  unit  scale  elasticity,  and
there are perfectly  competitive markets  everywhere.34 The children's and their parents'  labor
are perfect technical substitutes.
The parents  may  transfer  some of the  income  in  the  first period-bequests-to  be
added  to their children's income in the second period.  They may also- save and add  to their
own income in the second period.  The children may or may not receive  a share  of their own
wage  income  in  the  first  period,  but this  is  decided  by  the  parents.  The  income  that  the
children receive in the second period is frilly under their control,  however.
As in Becker,  the linchpin of the analysis is what happens  to the transfers.  Note that
there are two ways parents may transfer income to their children  in the second period: either
through direct monetary transfers, bequests,  or through the children's spending their time on
not working.  By assumption,  the economic  value of one time unit spent on education in the
first period  is above unity.  The maximization  is performed by the parents.  The children only
adjust  their consumption in the  second period  to fill up all income  received.  If in optimum
the  bequest  hits  its  lower  bound,  zero,  Baland  and  Robinson  show  that  a  non-Pareto
allocation may result.  The children may work too much in the first period.
Since the children dispose of their own income in the second period, the adults might
not be sufficiently rewarded for not letting the children work. When the parents are either too
poor or not sufficiently  altruistic  to leave the children any bequests, this would be the case.
Then, if it was possible for the children to compensate their parents for not letting them work,
the welfare  of both  children and adults might increase.  To reduce  child labor (and  increase
education)  would be  a Pareto  improvement.  This result is,  of course,  only valid in the case
34  These  are,  of course,  not  at  all  realistic  assumptions  in  an  African  context,  where  production  is
mainly done within the household  and where markets for child labor are likely to be missing  in many places. As
long as consumption and production decisions may be separated, these assumptions are fairly innocent  and may
be  added  to  a number  of other  assumptions  that  are  of a  more  technical  nature  that  are  needed  to  reach
conclusive  results.
38when  not  working  in the  first  period  increases  productivity  "sufficiently"  in  the  second
period.
Note that this result does not hinge on any ordinary imperfection  in the credit market,
for  making the parents  invest too little in  schooling  and  letting  them labor too much.  It  is
given  by the  decision  structure  in the  family.  The  children  are  not  allowed  to  make  any
decisions  in  the  first  period;  hence  they  cannot  make  any  credible  commitments  for  the
second period.  They can only promise to do so in the second period, but that promise is not
credible,  because they  now are in full control  of their  income, and  they have no reasons  to
spend  anything  on  their parents.  Given  this  decision  structure,  there  is  no  way  that  the
children may commit themselves in the first period.
But why would this not be a problem also when there are positive bequests? Because
the parents  can first transfer  income to their children in the  second period by making  them
work  less until  the return  of the  two methods  is equal.  That will  happen when the child's
wage  rate in the first period is equal to the marginal return of the last hour spent in education.
After that, monetary transfers will be more effective.
What happens if there is reverse altruism-that children care about their parents, may
transfer  income to them in the  second period,  and their parents  still know their preferences
and calculate their degree of altruism in their own maximization?  The non-Pareto  optimality
might still  occur  if the  parents'  degree  of altruism  is too  weak  or if the  credit  market  is
imperfect.
It follows from their model that the children work more the less altruistic their parents
are and the lower their wages. The authors interpret that to mean that child labor is an aspect
of poverty.  An increase  in the children's  wages, however,  will also increase  family income
without similar clear effect on the family supply of child labor.
Lack of credit markets
If imperfections  in the credit market  exist so that the parents are  unable to borrow in
the  first  period,  excessive  child  labor  may  also  arise in  situations  where  parents  transfer
resources to the  children in the second period.  These bequests would then be partly financed
by  the  children's  own  labor.  This  situation  occurs  when  the  parents'  preference  for
consumption in the first period is strong compared with the second period.  When not allowed
39to dissave  in the first period, they can only increase their consumption in the first period by
letting  their  children  work  more.  Altruistically,  they  are  willing  to  sacrifice  part  of their
second  period consumption by letting their children  receive some bequests.  In  this case  the
excessive  child  labor  could  be  avoided  by  a  perfect  credit  market  that  would  allow  the
parents to dissave in the first period.
If,  however, the parents  are  sufficiently altruistic,  if the  children are not "rotten" and
consider their parents'  welfare "enough"  when they are allowed to make decisions, then child
labor may not be excessive even in situations where the parents leave no bequests.
The  families  may not  be  expected  to  solve  these  inefficiencies  themselves.  Given
some assumptions about technology, Baland and Robinson also show that a marginal ban (for
example  a  reduction  in the  number  of hours  children  are  allowed  to  work  each day  or a
reduction in their age) may be efficient in a general  equilibrium context. The same will apply
to a subsidy of education paid by taxes of the parents or obligatory schooling.
Read literally,  the model presupposes a market for child labor, but it may be adapted
to  situations  with household  production.35 In order  to  explain  some  of the  empirical  facts
about  child labor  on African  farms,  it must,  of course,  be  modified.  For,  example  when  a
decline  in the parents'  income  increases  the child labor supplied,  it does so because  it does
not influence  the marginal productivity  of the children's  work. In farm households,  the farms
with more assets  are assumed to have both higher  income and  higher marginal  productivity
of the children's  labor, so  if there are  some fixed  costs of employing children  from outside
the household, there may be a less clear correspondence  with poverty levels and the amount
of child labor unless  the  model  is modified.  In  addition,  as the  empirical  studies  showed,
35  The  assumptions  needed  are the standard  assumptions  applied for household  models  to allow the
separation of consumption  and production  decisions.  The children may move freely across households to have
markets  for  child  labor  in  a  household  economy.  If the  household  is confined  to  employing  only  its  own
children, paradoxically  some aspects of the situation analyzed by Baland and Robinson (and not presented here)
may fit  better,  like  the  absence  of shirking.  However,  it  becomes  difficult  to  believe  that the  children  are
completely  free  to dispose  of their income  in  the second  period when  a household  economy  is based on  an
extended family system.  At the same time it is doubtful that the authority structure assumed  for the first period
is likely to hold when the children are working  for other monitors. These are both examples of situations  where
the second assumption  for separation  of the two types of decisions  inside the household  does not hold. This  is
not to imply any serious criticism of the model;  it moves at a different  level of abstraction.
40child and adult labor appear often to be complementary inputs, not substitutes, as assumed by
Baland and Robinson.
Child labor and  fertility
In another paper Baland and Robinson (1998b) explore another possible inefficiency
of a family  decision  structure  that  may  arise  when  the  household  head  also  decides  the
number of children  endogenously.  In a similar way as for child labor, they  argue that left to
itself the family will choose to have too many children.  The older children are unable to pay
their  parents  not  to  have  the  last  child.  It  is  of special  interest  to  note  that  within  the
framework increased  child labor does not necessarily go together with increased  fertility. To
put it simply, if the productivity of the schooling is high, that tends to increase fertility more
than child labor will.
Deaton  and  Muellbauer  (1986)  have  shown  that  even  in  developing  countries  the
economic  costs of having children are so high (30-40 percent of household  income) that the
income  resulting  from  child labor is  not likely to be high enough to compensate  (in Ghana
children  supplied  around  5  percent  of total  hours  worked,  in  Cote  d'Ivoire  around  10
percent).  Combined with the valid arguments of Baland and Robinson,  it is sufficient reason
for  doubting  any  simplistic  causal  chain  from  extensive  child  labor  and  too  high  fertility
based on parents'  economic calculation of the net value of increasing their child stock. A few
case  studies  made  from  exceptionally  transparent  communities  by  social  anthropologists
(Blurton  Jones  et  al.  1989,  1994)  present  evidence  that  extensive  child  labor  allows  for  a
nexus of high fertility-high labor participation rates, however.
Non-Pareto  optimal allocation of  risk
The Baland and Robinson assumptions about the family decision  structure may  also
be applied to argue that the children  shoulder too large a share of the  family risk-taking  by
working  too much  in  the  first period.36 The  simplest  way  to  see this  is to  reinterpret  the
children's  income  in the  second  period  as the  income  net of the  income  loss  due  to  the
36  This  section  presents  the  argument  that  child  labor  exposes  children  to  excessive  risks.  The
characterization  of  children  describes  child  labor  as  a  way  to  cope  with  risk.  Is  this  not  an  outright
contradiction?  To  see that it  is not, note that this section's model assumes that the family structure  is intact.  A
more fundamental risk for a child will often be that its family protection will crumble.  To cope with this risk in
an uncertain environment,  the child should  learn to work as soon as possible.
41fraction  of children  who  have  become  disabled  due  to  their  labor  as  children  in  the  first
period. If they go to  school or play,  fewer will become  disabled.37 One of the reasons  why
schooling gives rise to increased human capital is that the human loss of this kind is reduced.
In the same way  as before  the children are unable to make a credible  promise to pay
their parents the  insurance of not working. This will be the case even if it follows from this
reinterpretation  of their model  that the  adults  will  pay for their  children's  consumption  in
their first period as adults, in case they are disabled.  (The consequences for the children's life
in  their  second  period  as  adults  are  not  considered  in  this  model;  this  would  only  have
reinforced the argument.)
Systematic parent  mistakes
Baland  and  Robinson  have  no  discussion  of the  labor  offer  of either  children  or
adults.  The  only inefficiency  that may arise  is the  effects  of the  children's  work  on  their
schooling.  However, much of the ethical intuition about child labor is about the labor offers.
Is it likely that the children's labor offers become too high compared with the adults'?
Within a Samuelson type of family welfare  function, each member will work until the
marginal  loss of the  family welfare  is equal to his wage.  If parents  and children  have equal
weights  and  identical  utility functions,  children  should  still work  less  than  adults  if their
wages are  lower. They are not identical,  however.  For example, evidence from experimental
psychology  indicates  that  time  passes  more  slowly  for  children  who  perform  work  they
consider  boring  (but  may  even  pass  more quickly  for exciting  tasks).38 If only the  boring
tasks  are  considered,  the  parents  underestimate  the children's  disutility  of labor  and make
37 Baland and Robinson themselves  point to the hazards of child labor in their introduction,  and refer
to Nangia (1987),  who claims that one  in three working children dies  before reaching age  18.  If this is true for
India,  such  numbers  are  unlikely  for  African  child  labor  performed  in  the  households.  However,  it  is  well
documented  from  traffic  research  in  OECD  countries  that  children  have  less  ability  to  cope  with  risky
situations.  So the argument  is relevant for all types of risky labor situations that children are encountering.  The
actual  allocation  of risks  will depend on the  actual dangers  involved  in the  production  process:  what kind  of
crop, climate,  use of pesticides,  and  so on. This argument should perhaps not be overstated if the alternative is
uncontrolled  play.  Particularly  for boys,  that play might  not be less  risky.  Comparing  households  with firms,
again  this  is  an  area  of comparative  advantage  for  households.  They will  at least  internalize  some  of this
external  effect. Parents  will tell their children  in which part  of their fields there are likely to be  snakes,  which
plants are poisonous,  and so on. A later section will present  an extreme  case where the children do no work at
all before  15-17 years of age because of the risks involved.
42them  experience  higher marginal  disutility of work than that intended.  Questionnaires  have
produced  evidence that parents underestimate the actual amount of time their children spend
on  work,  particularly  in  recall  data.  This  effect  is  demonstrated  for  the  Philippines  in
Evenson  et  al.  (1980).  In  both  cases  they  are  actually  maximizing  the  wrong  utility
function.39 Compared  with the correct  one, the children will labor too much. The  same will
apply to the  Baland-Robinson head of household's utility function,  except that the last type
of mistake is unlikely, since the children supply their labor in the market.
Nonaltruistic  parents
The  normative  assumptions  applied  until  now  have  been  rather  uncontroversial.
Situations  have  been  discussed  where  welfare  economics  may  reach  clear  answers,  and
where  there  are  either  possible  Pareto  improvements  or  some  clear  instances  of
misallocations  that  cause  children  to  work  more  than  intended.  In  the  Baland-Robinson
model  the  children  have  to  consume  more  and  labor  less  as  the  parents  become  less
altruistic.40 Would  the  rate of investment  in human  capital go  down and,  presumably,  also
the growth rate of the economy? Hence the more altruistic  the parents, the better? This is not
unconditionally  a reasonable  answer.  Within the altruism range where there  is no scope  for
Pareto-improving  reduction  in child labor, the children will reach higher consumption levels
than their parents-a return to a classic dilemma of intertemporal  allocation in economics.
Discussion of that possibility goes beyond the scope of this paper,  but it points to a
real  dilemma:  Is  it  right  to  sacrifice  some of the  children's  future  increase  in  production
capacity  by making  them  labor  to  maintain their parents'  rate  of consumption?  The more
efficient the educational system is, the larger is the efficiency  loss if the parents do not allow
their children  to be educated,  but the larger the  difference  in the parents'  and the children's
38 In fact, children's experience  of time is a quite complicated  research area, where different  aspects of
the labor tasks may have different effects on experienced time. I believe, however, our presentation to be a fair,
popular summary of the relevant research in psychophysics (see, for example, Arlin,  1986,  1989).
39 To claim that this is another case of a non-Pareto  optimal allocation  is somewhat tricky, however. If
the parents got the true information, their utility would go down, and the children's stay the same. After the
correct  information has arrived, they will adjust so both their and their children's utility are raised. But
compared with the solution of the uninformed maximization  problem their utility may be lower. If so, the first
allocation does not have a non-Pareto  allocation.
43consumption levels will be. How altruistic should the parents be? What is the optimal amount
of child  labor?  Efficiency  may  pull  it  toward  zero,  fairness  toward  some  finite  positive
amount.41 Note  that  inefficient  school  systems  increase  the  amount  of child  labor  that  is
acceptable  on efficiency  grounds  while they lessen the  strength of the fairness argument.  In
any case,  in this world, where the parents make  all the decisions in the first period, they may
force their children to enjoy arbitrary small shares of family consumption  and zero schooling.
Poverty may make altruism a norm of luxury, and, when combined with an inefficient
schooling  system,  even  an  extremely  high  incidence  of child  labor -might  not  cause  any
Pareto  inefficiency.  Other ethical  criteria must be  introduced  or other real  world  situations
outlined to judge whether reducing  child labor in Sub-Saharan Africa would be important for
the poor in the continent.
The Basu- Van model or the low wages trap
In a model  developed  by Basu  and Van (1998)  the parents  are  completely  altruistic
and  withdraw  their children  from  the  labor market as  soon  as their  own income  exceeds  a
certain threshold.42 Unlike what happens in the Baland-Robinson model, the children's labor
offer enters  directly  into the family  welfare function.  Nevertheless,  excessive  child  labor in
the Pareto  sense  may  arise  in this model  too,  but not in the  single  isolated  family.  It may
happen as a result of the workings of the whole labor market.
If everyone is very poor, both the adults and the children enter the labor market.  Since
child labor  and adult labor are near substitutes,  the  child labor pushes the adult  wage rates
down, which may get the economy stuck in a low wages-high  child labor participation rate
equilibrium.  The  same  economy  may,  however,  also  reach  another  equilibrium  where  the
adult wages stay high because they are high  enough to make the altruistic parents keep their
children out of the labor market.  In this economy everyone  is better off.
40 This  relationship  is  an interesting,  testable  implication  of the model.  In the one bargaining  model
that  introduces  children  as  separate  bargainers  so  far,  Moehling  (1997)  predicts  that the  children's  share  of
family consumption  will increase, when they work,  and she substantiates it with U.S. historical data.
41  In the Baland-Robinson  model the altruism parameter  is exogenous.  It is reasonable  to consider it as
a kind of social norm where the parents are fixing it on the basis of what they expect the other parents are doing.
Increases  in average income  levels are likely to move it up.
42 This behavior pattern does not have to be based on altruism.  Chayanov-like  income targets combine
with an assumption that when  the aim is reached,  the least productive members of the household will be the first
to withdraw.
44Hence  the  child  labor in the  first  equilibrium  is  not a  Pareto-optimal  situation,  and
economists  would have  no hesitation  in applying  policy against it-for example by banning
it.  In practical policy one  should  be  careful  not to assume that  an economy with high  child
labor participation rates necessarily is stuck in a non-Pareto optimal equilibrium,  however.  If
the productive possibilities in the economy  are too poor, the Basu-Van  model will  predict a
single  high child-labor  participation  rate equilibrium.  Forcing on it a ban on child labor will
only force on it a deeper level of poverty.
While interesting  and important for economies with a high rate of child labor supplied
to private  firms in the market,  the  low incidence  of such child  labor in  Sub-Saharan  Africa
makes  the possibility  of the  non-Pareto  child  labor  trap remote  at  the  moment.  Given  the
indication  of excess  supply of child labor when jobs become  available,  the possibility may
soon  become  relevant,  however,  and  a  question  arises  whether  a ban  on  child  labor-if
implemented-will make the African countries stay poorer than their production possibilities
warrant or if the ban may make them avoid the high child-labor participation rate trap.
Applied welfare economics
The only  applied  welfare  economics  study of African child  labor (Canagarajah  and
Coulombe  1998)  is from Ghana.  Like the theoretical  studies,  the focus  is on the interaction
between  schooling  and  child  labor.  The  policy  instrument  that  was  assessed  in  the  cost
benefit  analysis  was  the  effects  of giving  a  10  percent  income  subsidy to  children  out of
school.  The benefits  are the present  value of the  expected  income  increase  of the  children
who now  get schooling  during the  years they  are in the labor force.  The costs  include the
value  of the  subsidy,  the  increase  in schooling  costs  due  to  increased  attendance,  and  the
income loss due to the decreased  earnings of the children now going to school.  That loss is
valued at one-third of the earnings of an adult without education.
The difference  between social and private return is built into the cost benefit analysis
with a higher discount rate for the private net return.  The final result shows a significant but
modest social return.  The cost to Ghana of having its present stock of 800,000 children not
going to school is estimated at somewhat  less than  1 percent of GDP.
Comparison of recent economic research  on child labor in general  and child  labor in
Africa in particular with a  1981  study (Rodgers and Standing) of the broad issues analyzed  in
45child labor  to that  date  shows  that  a  noteworthy  narrowing  of the research  field has been
taking  place.  The  interaction  of education  and  child  labor  is  mainly  the  focus.  Recent
research has also been more professional.  Data have been produced  and published that make
these  phenomena  amenable  to  modem  econometric  analysis.  Baland  and  Robinson  have
shown that the problem may be studied  by applying  standard welfare analysis  and possibly
even  be condemned  without using any stronger ethical judgments than the notion of Pareto
inefficiency.
Opening upfor social anthropology
One of the reasons why standard welfare economics  may be less helpful is that social
norns are obviously important when it comes to children's work in the households.  Standard
welfare economics  is not generally very helpful  in determining which norms should be lifted
and which should  be introduced.  There  are  exceptions, however.  For example,  Udry (1996)
made a detailed microeconomic  study of agricultural production  in an area of Burkina Faso
showing that the  allocation  of male  and female  labor input was inefficient  across plots (the
allocation of plots across genders was inefficient).  Detailed studies  of the allocation of boys'
and girls'  labor are likely to tell similar  stories  for  many areas  of Africa  (see,  for  instance,
Mason  and  Khandker's  data  from  Tanzania),  showing  that  shifting  tasks  to  boys  should
improve efficiency.  That is, if it is possible to change norms about what girls and boys should
do,  economic  efficiency  (and  fairness  as  seen  from  an  European  point  of view)  should
improve.
This  should  be  possible,  because  rather  rapid  change  in this  area has  already taken
place.  In some Africans  countries,  for  example,  when the colonial  powers were  established
most  domestic  servants  were  boys,  but  they  are  now  girls,  a  norm  change  traced  for
Zimbabwe  by  Grier  (1994).  This  change  was  not politically  engineered  and might  not be
considered  desirable,  but  it  is  important  for  explaining  and  evaluating  the  child  work
phenomenon in Africa.
Compounding the  policy  difficulties  in this  area  is the  fact that  norms  are  likely  to
constitute systems. Changing one norn  may cause changes in others in ways that economists
are not accustomed to think about and where welfare economics  is silent. Norms are also less
likely  to  be directly  influenced  by  conscious  policy.  Policy  changes  may  have  surprising
46consequences.43 This  is  actually  an  infant  research  area  for  economists,  but  so  far  relies
mainly on contributions from social anthropology.
Social Anthropological  Research into Child  Labor in Sub-Saharan  Africa
It would be wrong to claim that social norms have had the  same theoretical  status  in
social  anthropology  that  constrained  maximization  has  had in economics.  It has been  only
one of several  distinct theoretical frameworks applied. Nevertheless, it has been an important
perspective almost forced on social anthropologists by their having to learn how to behave in
societies that differ  from their own  before they can  analyze  them.  Because they have  been
mapping household behavior in African countries  for almost a century, social anthropologists
have,  of course,  also  collected  much  information  about  the  children's  behavior,  including
their  work.  Most of the  information  about  children  is  buried  in  articles  and  monographs
addressing  other  issue$,  a  literature  too vast  for adequate  survey.  The  studies that  actually
address  child labor  are few,  and  even fewer have  an explicit  comparative  perspective.  The
comparative perspective  is perhaps most pronounced in Bradley (1993).
Child labor andfamily task allocation
Bradley's  work  is  related  to  the  great  effort  made  by  a  group  of  American
anthropologists led by G. P. Murdoch to collect descriptions of behavioral  rules from a large
number of different societies  in a standardized  way. The descriptions were gathered  in a data
base, an "ethnographic  atlas,"  that could function  much like  a museum  of material  artifacts
(one version is Murdoch  1967). The approach  was rather inductionist in spirit. The behavior
patterns  were  compared  in  different,  often  random  ways to  discover  empirical  correlations
that might then be used for different  theoretical  purposes.  For example, estimates about the
timing of the correlations  of the behavior  pattern might,  for example,  be applied  to ascertain
diffusion patterns across societies and time.
43 Bird (1996) reports  on an attempt to make lone parenthood less desirable by limiting cash benefits.
Policy makers believed that this would be achieved through  two mechanisms.  The obvious one was to make the
choice of lone parenthood  less attractive.  The second was for the resulting decline in the number of lone parents
to cause a decrease  in the social acceptance  of the state-to change  social norms. According to Bird, the norm
changed in the opposite direction from that predicted:  lone parenthood became more acceptable.
47In her study of child  labor Bradley specifies  15 different tasks such as water carrying,
marketing,  land clearing,  and harvesting.  The population of 91  different societies, including
17  African  ones, is divided  into five  groups, adult men,  adult women, boys aged 6-10,  girls
aged 6-10,  and children below age 6. Ethnographic  evidence is then used to determine which
task  is  done  by which  group  and at which  age  the children  start to  do  the different  tasks.
Certain tasks,  such as  large-game  hunting  and  clearing of land, were  done by adult men in
almost all societies.
Bradley's main conclusions  are:
1.  Children tend to do the same tasks as adults of the same gender.
2.  Children,  especially  younger  children, do more of the adult women's tasks,  and
Bradley  assumes this is  because they  occupy the  same space as  the women  and
women normally control the children's work and socialize them.
3.  Some tasks normally are done only by children  (such as tending small animals).
This  implies  that the  more  important  the  child-specific  tasks  are  in  the  society  in
question,  the larger  the share of the total  work is done  by children.  But more  interestingly,
the larger  the share of total  tasks that are  assigned women,  the larger the  share of tasks are
done by children, particularly by small children.  Thus what girls and boys do is not simply a
question  of  socialization  to  adult  roles.  The  number  of  child-specific  tasks  and  their
importance and the number of woman-specific  tasks and their importance are all influential.
Note  what Bradley does here.  She says that one kind of rules-task assignments  for
adults-determines  another  set  of rules-tasks  assigned  to  children.  These  rules,  together
with the actual distribution of the economic activities, to a large extent  determine how much
the  children  have  to  work  in  a  given  situation.  Economists  may  like  to  think  of it  as
analogous  to  an  input-output  system,  where  rules  for  task  assignment  are  the  input
coefficients  and the size of the economic  tasks acts like a demand  system to determine  the
scale  of the labor  activities  allocated  to the  different  groups.  The  setup  is somewhat  more
ambitious, however,  because the task rules  may  appear as both exogenous  and endogenous
variables.  As just mentioned,  the number and character of tasks of the women to some degree
determine  the  children's  tasks  over and  above  straight  socialization  to  adult roles  because
younger boys often do women's tasks.
48The different  task assignments  must, of course, also  be more  or less appropriate  for
children  at  their  various  stages  of socialization.  For  example,  while  children  aged  6-10
harvest  in  81  percent of the 91  societies,  they plant in 64 percent,  but only  assist with land
clearing  in 33  percent  of these  societies.  In comparing the workloads  of boys and  girls, the
distribution  of  workloads  between  adult  males  and  females  is,  of  course,  of  major
importance.  When  adult females carry many tasks, the effects on girls are double: they have
to work much because they have  to become  adult women, the  socialization factor,  and they
have  to  do  much  (like their  young  brothers)  because  their  mothers  are  busy  and  they are
nearby.  Table  6 illustrates the difference  between  this type of explanation of child labor and
an economic one.
Table 6. Children's time allocation  in Botswana Percent
Activities  ____  toys  G  Girls
Ages  7-9  Ages  10-14  Ages  7-9  Ages  10-14
Animal tending  22.3  28.8  3.2  3.5
Trading  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.5
Crop husbandry  2.1  3.0  2.4  3.5
Wage labor  0.4  0.4  0.1  0.8
Hunting/gathering  1.2  1.6  1.6  2.6
Reparing  0.8  0.5  0.5  0.8
Child care  3.8  1.7  10.5  5.5
Water collection  1.6  2.3  4.8  6.3
Housework  2.8  4.4  9.5  15.5
Illness  1.5  1.5  1.1  2.0
Schooling  11.1  13.7  14.4  17.4
Leisure  52.3  43.5  52.0  41.0
Source: Chernichovsky  et al. (1985, tables 3.5 and 3.6).
The  data  here  are  not  rules  for  task  assignment,  but  the  children's  actual  time
allocation,  but  they  still  show  the  importance  of differences  between  the  genders.  Since
animal  husbandry  is such  an  important  part of Botswana's  economy,  boys  and  girls have
about the same share of leisure.44
44 As noted before, girls'  work is probably understated,  particularly their child care activities, which
are notoriously difficult to measure since they are so often undertaken together with other activities,  including
play.
49What  would happen  if Botswana  suddenly  shifted out of animal  husbandry  and into
specialized  agriculture?  Economists  would  tend  to  predict  that  the  short-run  consequence
would  be  that  some  boys  will  be  underemployed  or  unemployed,  but  after  a  while  the
gendered  division  of labor  would be  realigned  so that boys would get new tasks and move
their marginal productivity into line with the girls'  in order to optimize the household welfare
function.
A strict  social  anthropological  prediction  along  Bradley's  lines  will show,  however,
that  the  rules  for  task  assignment  will  remain  stuck,  and  men's  and  boys'  leisure  will
increase,  while the women and the girls will increase their workloads.  The norms regulating
the gendered task division  are moving slowly, will be propagated  to new generations through
socialization,  and  have  a  strong  impact  on observed  behavior,  even  when  leading  to  very
inefficient  results.  Despite  the roughness  in both the theory and  the  statistical  methods  for
gaining  evidence,  many  will  feel  that the  last theory  is a  better  fit  for the  broad  facts  of
African development,  where so many tasks have been assigned to African girls and women.
According to Bradley, in summary, how much the children work is partly determined
by  social structure,  rules about female  and  male tasks, and partly by the economic structure
of the community in question, which determines  the relative frequency  of the different tasks
that are  appropriate  for the children and how often they will apply.  The scope of choice, the
main focus of the economists'  explanation, narrows  and becomes less interesting.
It  is  a  fact  of African  agriculture,  in  those  areas  where  animal  husbandry  is  not
important,  that  the  women  do  an  extraordinary  share  of  the  tasks  in  the  agricultural
households.  Hence,  Bradley's research may supply a reasonable hypothesis  for why the child
labor participation rates in African countries are higher than on other continents.
Bradley's  observations  receive  support  from  another  type  of research,  presented  in
Munroe  et  al.  (1984).  This research  group  took  a sample  of 48  children  from each of four
"traditional"  societies  in  Belize,  Samoa, Nepal,  and  Kenya in  the age  group  three  to nine.
Local investigators were used in assessing what was work in a sample of 30 observations  for
each  child  through  an  observation  period  of  six  weeks.  They  recorded  the  number  of
observations  when  they  were  working.  Parents'  activity  was  also  recorded  (but  fewer
50observations  for  each)  and  whether  the  children  were  in  social  interaction  when  they
worked/did not work.
On average  the  children  were working  23 percent  of the time  they were  observed;
already  at  three  years  they  were  working  during  10  percent  of the  observations.  Across
cultures  they found  support  for  Chayanov's  rule:  as  the  number of consumers  divided  by
producers  increased,  the  percentage  of observations  where  the  children  worked  increased.
This was probably mainly caused by the impact of infants and their effect on the children's
work. Lonely motherhood was also significant (and would cause a high Chayanov ratio).45
What supported Bradley's hypotheses  was the fact that the African children  (from the
Logoli tribe in Kenya) were working significantly  more often when they were between  ages
five  and  seven,  but the  difference  became  less after  that.  Munroe's  results  also  supported
Ainsworth's observation that children who were not residing  with their natural parents  were
working more.
The main problem addressed  in the Munroe article  was, however,  not work as  such,
but  rather  how  children's  labor became  associated  with  specific  interaction  patterns  with
other children and with adults; how it contributed to socializing the children.
Child labor  and socialization
First  of  all,  like  Bradley,  Munroe  found  that  the  child's  work  activities  were
positively related to the mother's workload.  Children's labor activities caused more frequent
rejection  responses  on  the  part  of  parents  and  were  associated  with  more  frequent
responsibility responses  on the part  of children  than were  other types of child behavior.  In
other words,  child  labor was a particular  way of changing the  child and  adapting  it to the
environment, a way of socializing the child.
A striking difference between the economics and social anthropology literature on the
subject of child  labor in Africa  is that  this major theme in  anthropology  is practically  not
dealt  with  at  all  in  economics.  The  central  part  of economics  deals  with  the  choice  of
45 It is worth noting that in this type of research female households  are clearly measured,  while in the
large  surveys, the measurement  errors here  are  probably so large  that the study of the  impact of single  female
household  heads  is of less  value.  Hence  the result  shown  in Munroe  et al.  is important,  although  the authors'
statistical procedures are not transparent.
51economic  agents  with given preferences.  Analyzing  situations  where  these  preferences  are
deliberately  changed  or  changed  endogenously  as  the  outcome  of interacting  systems  of
economic  variables  appears  often  too  complex  to  be  handled  with  the  analytical  rigor
economists  normally  demand  of themselves.  Moreover,  the  subject  itself  may  be  said
properly to belong to psychology.  Often the only social scientists on the spot, anthropologists
have  not  shared  these  inhibitions  against  scientific  transgression,  and  socialization  has
become their major issue in their analyses of child labor.
While  Bradley's  study is wholly based on other anthropologists'  fieldwork,  Munroe
et al.  (1984) have collected data from field observations  in different societies, but only quick
and designed ones.  Neither has done the long, thorough  fieldwork,  staying in a community
for  longer  periods  and  participating  in  its  affairs  for  their  studies  on  child  labor,  that
characterizes  much  of the  field's  best  empirical  research.  Only  a  few  major  studies  have
focused on children's work of this kind, and all have socialization as a major theme.
One  (Bock  1998)  almost  wholly  addresses  the  problems  of socialization  and  skill
acquisition.46 Bock studies two widely different communities  in the same area of Botswana,
but each  inhabited by different  tribes.  In one,  A,  there  is hardly  any cash  economy and the
main livelihood is farming,  some animal husbandry,  and hunting/fishing. There  is no store in
the  community,  and  a  car  was  seen  once  every  second  week.  Cash was  mainly  received
through  remittances;  about  20  percent  of the  men  were  working  outside  the  community,
temporarily  migrated.  The  children were  doing  a wide  set of tasks.  The  workload  for the
boring tasks was slowly increasing with age.
An interesting  observation  made  by Bock (1995)  is that within the  set of traditional
activities,  there  is  a  trade-off  similar  to  that  observed  in  the  choice  between  labor  and
education:  the  parents  may allocate  their children's  time  to  simple  tasks  where they  give
immediate  output,  or they may assign the children  more difficult  tasks where the children's
output  is low  or almost  nonexistent  but  where  there  is an  important  training  component.
Children  who  are allowed much work of this kind become more productive  as adults.  Bock
claims that  in practice the  child's  sibling  status  is important.  The fewer siblings  it has, the
52more will it be forced  into the boring tasks,  and the less likely is it that it will receive formal
schooling.47
Among the tasks of the first kind is the work that girls are doing in processing millet,
a demanding and boring task. No children below eight are doing it, but from then on the time
girls have to spend on it increases  gradually with age. At age  12 they spend an average  of 40
minutes a day only on this task;  the time increases to  50 minutes when the girls are  15,  and
60  minutes when  they are  18.  Adult  women  at age  30  spend  97 minutes  a day processing
grain.
At the other end of the spectrum is hunting large animals. This demands long learning
periods and traditionally men are not competent at it before their mid-twenties.
In  community  A,  only 20  of 120  children  are  attending  school.  They  return  home
every weekend, walking 30 kilometers through the bush.
The other community, B, is dominated by wage labor for the tourist industry (safaris).
Both women and men are working for wages that are comparatively high. The work is
dangerous,  however,  and people  are killed  (by crocodiles,  buffaloes,  and  so  on).  They  do
little  food production.  All children  above  seven years  old  (81  children)  attend  school,  but
they can only return home  during school  holidays.  When at home they do  little work.  This
community  used  to be  a more  specialized  hunting-gathering  society  than A  and  had  little
agriculture.  The inhabitants'  present affluence,  earned  as wage  laborers,  is based  on skills
and knowledge of the fauna acquired during that period.
Bock tried to test the skill level for traditional tasks between the two communities. He
found  that  although  the  girls  in  B  were  tested  as  stronger  than  the  girls  in  A,  their
productivity  when  doing  the  traditional  millet-processing  is lower,  particularly  among the
younger girls. Despite their parents'  specializing in game observation, the children of B have
lost most of the knowledge of local  wildlife and  scored much lower than the children in A
46  I have  not  had access  to the  Ph.D.  dissertation  (Bock  1995),  but only a more  popular summary
(Bock  1998).
47  Here  Bock  points  toward  an  explanation  of why  larger  families  may  have  higher  schooling
participation  rates  than  smaller  families  in  some  African  countries,  if they  are  not  financially  constrained.
Financially  poor  families  are  likely  to be  more constrained  with  more  children,  and  here  larger families  are
likely to have  lower  participation  rates.  In  a  sample that contains  drawings  from  both these  populations,  the
53when  tested  about  the  local  fauna.  The  parents  in  B  have  been  unable  to  transmit  that
knowledge since their children are  at school and they are  at work. Despite  the fact that they
themselves  have a better  livelihood than most people  in Botswana,  they do not want or are
not able to transmit the necessary knowledge  to their children.  They consider their profession
too  dangerous.  They  would rather  let  their  children  be  prepared  for  modem  life  through
formal schooling than make them work for long hours in their local households.
The  paradox  is  that  more  investment  on  the  part  of the  parents  would  give  less
schooling  and  more  child  labor.  This  is,  of  course,  an  exceptional  situation  where  the
transmitting  of parents'  skill  demands  a  long  learning  period,  during  which  children  also
would have to work (but with low output).
Will the work of the children in A be harmful to them compared with the schooling of
the  children  in B? It is  rather obvious  that the  answer to  that question  relies  on the  macro
development in Botswana.  It is not only a question of what happens in A and B.
"Dance  civet cat"4 8 -or, are girls  exploited in African  families after all?
Unlike the other studies that portray child labor in traditional African households as a
kind of socialization  into  necessity,  Reynolds (1991),  giving a very detailed  description of
the  children's  labor  activities  in  a  poor  village  in  northern  Zimbabwe,  paints  a  harsher
picture.  The  distribution  of labor  is  blatantly  unfair.  When  the  mothers  are  forcing  their
daughters  to work more than they feel  like,  violent punishment is routinely  meted out in an
otherwise nonviolent population.
Reynolds  tries  to  see  life in the village  from  a child's perspective  and supports  her
observations with detailed  statistics  about allocation of the children's time.  She observes 12
families, including 69 children.  Her sample of children to be studied included less than 50 in
the  relevant  age  group,  so  the  possibility  for  statistical  inference  is limited.  Nevertheless,
both her results and her methods are interesting.
presence of siblings is likely to show a weak influence  on the school participation rate while it has strong effects
on both its sub populations, but with opposite signs.
48 The title of Reynolds's  (1991)  monograph on child  labor in a Tonga village  in Zimbabwe. The title
is  taken from  a children's  riddle  that plays  with the idea of children  as  controlled  by parents  and at the  same
time uncontrolled (Reynolds  1991, xv).
54She applies four different methods for recording the children's  time allocation.
1.  Peak labor records: the  researcher  makes  conventional  observations  during
harvests activities and the like and records  all labor performed by the different family
members.
2.  Instant records (IR):  the  researchers  perform random  sampling  of persons  and
meeting  times with pre-specified  persons  and record  what the person  in question  is
doing at the designated time.
3.  24-hour recall (24R):  each  person  in  the  sample  was visited  once  every  eight
days  and  asked  in detail  what  she  had  done  during the  past  24  hours.  This  is the
method closest to the one applied in the larger statistical living standard surveys.
4.  Observation (0): researchers  observe  for  two-hour  periods,  during which  the
activities of all present are recorded.
As might be expected,  the methods give  different  impressions of how extensive  the
children's  work burdens  are. For example,  while 0 made girls work 95 percent  of the time
recorded  and boys  60  percent,  IR made  girls work  65 percent  and boys 24 percent of the
time, and 24R gave 35 percent and  11  percent.  Since 24R is the closest to the one applied  in
the living standard surveys, while IR may in principle be the most valid, 49 Reynolds'  results
suggest that child labor is likely to be underreported  in those surveys.
The degree of unfairness  in the labor allocations  are indicated  in a 24R result, which
shows that during the busier seasons  women worked  on average  8 hours and 27 minutes and
men 3 hours and  32 minutes, while boys work  1 hour and 7 minutes and girls work 4 hours
and 49 minutes.  That is, the girls are working significantly more than adult men.  Moreover,
the  spread  in girls'  labor activities  is large:  some work  as  little  as boys,  others as much as
their mothers.  The data seem to indicate that the girls are not introduced to a gradual increase
of their workloads as in Botswana, but that the increase is rather stepwise:  a large minority of
the  girls  are treated  as  small children  and  given  some  freedom  to play,  while the  rest had
49 As  pointed out by Reynolds  herself, since  she  is a woman  she had less  access to men's and boys'
activities, so there is a female bias in her observations.
55approximately the  same workload  as adult women.  The different families  start to treat  their
girl children as adults at very different ages, however.
Of the survey-based  studies, those from Botswana and Ghana (and a forthcoming one
from  Benin)  do  not  support  the  impression  of wide  gender  disparities,  but  the  ones  from
Tanzania and Cote d'Ivoire do to some degree.50 There are also other field-based  studies that
indicate that the variation is, indeed,  considerable and that support Reynolds'  concerns.
Recall  that Reynolds  (1991)  with the IR method  found that in her poor Tonga village
in Zimbabwe,  the girls spent 65 percent of their waking (?) hours on labor while the boys  in
the same  age group worked only 24 percent of their time. This is an extreme result, but in a
similar  study Wenger  (1989)  observed  that in the  age  group  8-11,  girls  were  working  51
percent of the time  (daylight hours),  while  boys worked only 26 percent.  Wenger's method
was  to  visit  the  compounds  at  random  intervals,  watching  pre-assigned  children,  drawn
randomly from a list; that is the same method as the IR of Reynolds'  study. This study again
confirms  that when  domestic work  is included,  girls work considerably  more  than  boys  in
rural Africa,  except  for the pastoral societies, where the workloads  of boys are  heavier than
elsewhere.
Even  inside the  single family the distribution  of labor is often strongly  skewed,  not
only along  gender divisions,  but also between the individual children.  Reynolds  (1991)  has
some detailed data on the matter.  The household  survey-based  research  also  provides  some
indirect,  circumstantial  evidence.  Lloyd  and  Gage-Brandon  (1994,  303)  carried  out  an
empirical  study of fertility and schooling in Ghana; their findings  show that each additional
younger sibling significantly increases the probability for an older girl that she will drop out
of school,  but  the  same  is  not true  for  boys.  If the  observations  of Mason  and  Khandker
(1998) from Tanzania can be generalized, these  dropouts imply increased  child labor for the
girls.
50 Using the numbers  for weekly  working hours  from  Grootaert (1998),  which  is based  on a  survey,
and assuming  that  only  12  hours  a day  are available,  I calculate  that 38.76 percent  of the girls'  time  is spent
working while only  17.61  percent of the boys time is spent that way. This fits well with Reynolds's results from
the  24R-method.  A corresponding  calculation  from  Ghana  gives  15.74  percent  for  girls and  15.66 percent  for
boys, however.  The great difference  in the result for girls between Ghana and Cote d'lvoire is puzzling.
56Bledsoe  (1994)  indicates  how inequalities  in the  formal  labor market may reinforce
the unequal  distribution of labor  between  the  children  inside the household,  as  long as  the
formal  schooling  system  is perceived  as the  main method  of rent-seeking  for reaching  the
upper-end jobs. Then it pays for the families to pamper the academically  promising  children
and let the rest of the children do the work in the homesteads.  As societies change,  so does
the socialization of their children.
While  rational  from  an  economic  point  of view,  this  practice  often  gives  rise  to
considerable  emotional  strain  among siblings that may make  their labor  more harmful  than
would  otherwise  have  been  the  case.  The  close  interconnections  between  emotions  and
economic  activities are both a strength and a weakness of the family monitoring structure that
manages most of the child labor in Africa.
Child labor, socialization andfertility: some observations from hunter-gatherers
Even  in  the  countries  of Sub-Saharan  Africa,  hunting-gathering  peoples  are  tiny
minorities, and thus  less interesting from a macro-oriented  point of view. Nevertheless,  they
have been extensively studied by social anthropologists,  who have brought up ideas about the
causes  and  consequences  of children's  labor  in these  tiny,  transparent  societies  that may
supply hypotheses about causes and consequences  of child labor in other, larger societies.
Traditional Kung society  in Botswana versus Hadza in Tanzania.
Kung  is a  well-known  tribe  of hunter-gatherers  living  in the  Kalahari  Desert.  The
main subsistence activity is collection of fruits and nuts.  Observations from their life were an
important  source  of  inspiration  for  Sahlins'  theory  of  hunter-gatherers  as  "the  original
affluent  society"  (see  Sahlins  1972),  in which the adults work  only a few days in the week
and the children almost not at all.  Sahlins constructed  a theory of why adults  in general  did
not have to work long hours in these societies.  An obvious implication of it was that children
should also do little work.
That children work little in the Kung tribe is well  documented.  Draper and Cashdan
(1988) report, using random observations  of children aged 4-14 in daytime, each observation
lasting  10 minutes, that girls were working  6 percent of the recorded  time, while boys were
working 2 percent.  Children were almost  never going out on their own, foraging, but stayed
in the camps until they were at least 15.
57This  implies that their mother  has to collect  and carry all the staples  needed to feed
themselves  and their children.  The food  is far away from camp,  and they often have to walk
in extreme  heat.  They  bring home  more than 58 percent of the calories reaching the  camp.
They bring their smallest children with them, which implies that the older children have light
child-care responsibilities.  The children's weaning age  is three years.
Although  several  adults  are  usually present  in the  camp  at all  times,  the  recorded
interaction between the parents and their children is much more intense than between  a child
and  other  adults.  The  father  also  has  a  clear  responsibility  to  assist  in  feeding  his  own
children.  The  death  of the  father  decreases  his children's  survival  probability  significantly
(Blurton Jones et al.  1994).
Another important characteristic  was the low fertility of Kung, with an average birth
interval of four years (Blurton Jones et al.  1989).
The  Hadza  situation  is  different.  The food  is not  far away,  and the children  start to
work foraging at an  early age.  When they  are  five  years old they are  able to provide about
half of their own  calorie intake.  They  spend considerable  time working,  but no precise  and
comparable  time  allocation budget  for the  children is published.  When they are two-and-a-
half years old, they are weaned and left to the care of older children.
The  spaces  between  each birth  are shorter, the Hadza have  more children, and more
children  survive.  The  children  are  treated  more  harshly,  field  observers  claim,  and  the
children  are  ordered  around  more  by  their  mothers  and  by  other  adults.  The  death  or
disappearance  of the father  has no influence  on the child's survival probability,  and divorce
is very common.
The  key factor in explaining the  large difference  between these two  societies  is the
different  conditions for socializing  children to work.  Kung children are not sent out to work
because the distance to food, the heat, and the difficult terrain make their labor too risky and
the output too low.  For different reasons their position  in the family  is similar to the present
situation of children in the OECD countries.
The  key restraint  in the Kung  economy becomes  the  women's  carrying  capacity.  If
they have  too  many  children,  they  are  overloaded,  and the  children's  survival  probability
58goes  down.  By  not  being  able  to  labor,  children  become  expensive  in  this  society.  The
environment does not give much scope for a population  increase.
Hadza children have easy access to food, but that does not make their life softer. They
have to work more, but in this case it does not improve their bargaining position, and they are
treated more harshly.  They become less expensive,  and in the high fertility environment they
become more expendable.
Traditional  African  agriculture  shares  many  characteristics  of the  special  gathering
environment of the Hadza,  and it seems to reflect many of its characteristics:  a social nexus
of  high  fertility  and  a  high  child  labor  participation  rate  combined  with  a  fairly  high
children's  productivity  when  compared  with  the  adults'.  This  finding  suggests  that  high
fertility may  give  rise to  high child  labor participation rates,  while  the children's  ability to
cover a large share of their expenses at an early age contributes to the high fertility.
Seen from  a purely  economic  view,  even  among  the  Hadza,  having  a  child  is  not
profitable,  and child labor may not wholly explain the fertility rate. It may, however,  reduce
the  optimal  spacing  time  between  births  if the  maximand  is  the  number  of surviving
offspring.
Bush Kung versus sedentary Kung.
The Kung described  in the preceding section were a hunter-gatherer people living in
the  bush.  Most  Kung  bushmen  now  live  in  small  sedentary  units  doing  agriculture.
Anthropologists  have  studied  what  happened  during  the  transition  (Draper  and  Cashdan
1989).  The  adults, particularly  the  women,  became  busier.  The  interaction  between  adults
and  children  became  sparser,  while  interaction  among  the  children  of the  same  gender
increased.  The children started to do significantly more work, girls more than twice as much
and boys more than six times as much,51 and their activities became gender segregated.  The
boys went  away  from the compounds,  while the  girls  stayed  closer to home.  The  families
were still poor and could not yet afford cattle.
51  Their activity patterns were studied with the same method, random ten-minute  intervals.
59Draper and Cashdan explain this change in behavior mainly as having been caused by
the changes brought about in the children's socialization  environment:  the adults now can let
them  be  freer;  furthermore,  they  need  their  labor  input.  This  may  not  be  the  whole
explanation,  however.  Girls  and boys  in  the  bush  camps  were  treated  equally.  Why  now
suddenly turn to different tasks? Innate different behavior propensities may, of course, be one
possibility. More likely is a copying of the task allocation norms of their neighbors.
Not all  norms are equally invariant to changes  in the environment and thereby useful
in  generating  explanations.  How  could  the  bushmen's  norms  for  their children's  activity
evaporate  so quickly, while  the norms telling boys  and men to avoid  household  tasks have
shown themselves to be robust against adverse economic developments?
Child Labor and Social Norms
Traditionally some social anthropologists  used to borrow from the economists'  choice
perspective.  If any interaction  took place  between the academic  disciplines,  it was mainly in
one  direction.  This  is about  to change.  One  of the  key  concepts,  at least  in several  of the
many diverse directions  in sociology and social anthropology,  is social norms. Until recently
most economists  did not consider  the study of social norms  a fruitful path to understanding.
At a general  level this is about to change.  Economists  like Haavelmo  and Akerlof started to
explore  their  analytical  possibilities.  Today  there  is  almost  an  explosion  of theoretical
studies.
Closer to the subject of this paper, Agarwal (1997) has urged that the role of norms
should be brought into the study of household allocation conflicts, and Kevane (1998) has
applied norms and norms about norm deviation in a study of intra family allocation of female
labor power in western Sudan and a village of Burkina Faso. So far I have seen no attempt to
use norms in this way to explain the variation in child labor across communities, but Basu
(1999) made a brief sketch.
It  is obviously  an important  inroad.  It will  prove  almost  impossible to  explain  the
great difference in tasks and in total working hours between girls and boys in many African
communities  without  invoking  social  norms  as  behavioral  guidance,  or,  for that  matter,  to
explain  the  sudden  decrease  in children's  work  at  home  in most  OECD  countries.  Neither
60differences  in marginal  productivity  of boys  and  girls nor a  declining  set of tasks  at home
will suffice.
Observing  that  boys  work  less  than  girls  in  most  African  households  and  then
accepting  that this  happens  because  the  norms tell  them  so  is too  simple,  however.  This
might be done with almost any kind of behavior.  As Elster (1989)  pointed  out, norms need
sanctions,  and  sanctions need  someone  to shoulder their costs of implementation.  This  is an
important  part of a likely explanation  of why  girls work more.  When  boys are  allowed  to
leave the  household,  they are more  difficult to  monitor,  and to mete out  sanctions to them
becomes  more costly  for the  mother.  Their genetic  dispositions  may  also make them more
unruly  and harder to discipline on average.  So  societies that have  left the largest number of
tasks  for  women,  including  that of sanctioning  children,  will  tend to  make the  girls  work
more because doing so reduces the monitoring costs for their women.
There is wide space  for moving in different directions.  As Basu (1999)  pointed out,
while the introduction of social norms may appear analytically trivial, these norms are clearly
empirically  important  determinants.  It  is  also  difficult  to  imagine  that  the  child  labor
participation  rates  in Africa  can  be reduced  in the short  run without  any major changes  in
social norms. So a difficult policy question is whether or how to change norms.
Normative considerations  when social  norms determine child labor
One possibility  of combining  the norm-and-decision  perspective  is the  simple  one
that Akerlof suggested  and Kevane  (1998)  applied to African  adult female behavior.  That is
to consider the  amount of child labor  supplied for  a given  age and  sex as  guided by social
norms  and  to  include  deviation  of labor  actually  supplied  from  the  norm  as  a  negative
argument  in  the  family  welfare  function.  When  norms  loosen,  larger  deviations  in  both
directions  may be assumed.  In  many areas  stronger sanctions against girls may be expected
when  there  is  deviation  from  norms,  since  they  are  less  costly  to  implement  and  girls'
behavior  is  more  circumscribed  by  rules.  Whether  this  will  cause  larger  or  smaller
differences  depends on the direction of norm change and the economic forces.
The norm change may move in only one direction; telling, for example that in modem
families  children  should go to school,  not work.  It is difficult to accept for fairness reasons
the norms that regulate  girls'  economic  activity, but they may  be easier  to change  than the
61social  norms  that  regulate  males'  work  tasks  and  income  support  duties  in  many  African
communities.  Let us now say that the norms for girls'  productive  duties loosen due to some
modernization  norms. In practice  these norms will have to interact  with the older ones,  and
the outcome may be difficult to predict.  Will the consequence  simply be that the girls work
less, and  boys and adult males more?  Or will the consequence  be less food for girls,  earlier
marriages,  and early expulsion? More knowledge about the interaction between norms within
norm  systems  and the interplay between  social  norms and the  actual  behavior is needed  to
safely predict in this area.52
Conclusions
This  paper  has  presented  recent research  about child labor  in Africa.  It has  shown
quite  clearly  that most of that labor  is taking place  in the  large  African  household  sector.
Much of it is probably  unnecessary  in the sense that with a different and fairer allocation of
the tasks, girls'  workloads  could be easier without causing  a decline in production.  It is also
probably  an inefficient  allocation  of the children's  time  between labor and  education  in the
wide sense, even in areas where schooling is no alternative.
The  research  has not  conclusively  shown  that the  great  bulk of this work  is really
harmful  to  the  children,  that  it  is  labor  according  to  our  definition.  At  this  time  it  is
impossible  to  predict  whether  it  is better for  African  children  to work hard  or  go  more  to
school without knowing what will happen in the future; whether the African economies  will
grow in ways  that will make present  education productive.  If not, the allocative reasons  for
not letting children work become less compelling.
In other words, when policy makers need to decide whether labor activities should be
reduced  and  school  activities  increased  among  the  children  in  the  real  world,  where
bewildering sets of norms and institutions are operative,  one of their value premises will have
to be that a modern economy that can take advantage of current technological  knowledge  is
what African  societies really want their children to build.
52 The game-theoretic  literature of norms indicates the possibilities of a wide number of equilibriums,
perhaps  supporting the  frequently  held notion  among social  anthropologists  that local  communities  are like a
paper  card  house,  where  even  minor  external  interventions  might  upset  it  and  destroy  the society  they  have
learned to become fond of. A major point in this literature  is how difficult  it is to predict the outcome of planned
norm changes.  See, for example, Bird (1996).
62At all times,  however, many heads of household  will not be considering  the welfare
of their children.  Since  it is difficult to leave one's own  family, even  in an African  context
many children will be stuck with really harmful work burdens.  Even child work that is family
controlled raises good reasons for serious concern.
This  paper  has  focused  on family-controlled  child  labor,  which  is  likely  to be  the
major form of child labor in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Reynolds observes  (1991, xxxi) in the case
of the traditional Tonga people (north Zimbabwe):
The freedom of the children lies in the fact that once old enough to move about
they have a choice  in the matter of their residence  and thus of their guardian.
The Tonga say that a child must be permitted to decide where  it will stay since
otherwise  it  will cry that  it is  being treated  like  a  slave,  whereas  it  is  a  free
person....  Even if both parents are still alive and living together,  the children
may still take themselves off to live with other relatives.  Their parents have no
right to curb them....  The right to self-determination  among men, women and
children is a deeply held Tonga value.
In many parts  of Africa  there exist  similar traditions  for children's  leaving or being
expelled  when the conditions  warrant it. A follow-up  study will look into child labor that is
not family  controlled.  Here  intra household  bargaining becomes  more  important  as  well  as
the  child's  characteristics  as  an  economic  decision maker and  his or her  change  with age.
While  it is a smaller problem than family-controlled  child labor,  it is also a potentially  more
serious  one.  The  freedom  for the  children of the  isolated  Tonga  village  to  choose  parents
might  become  the  desperation  of children  isolated  from  their  families  on  the  streets  of
Nairobi or in the armies of Sierra Leone.
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This  is a review of research  on child labor  in Sub-Saharan  Africa. It focuses
on child labor taking place in the household  and controlled by relatives  of
the children since this is the most extensive form of child labor  in African
countries.  It  is also the form  of child labor that is the most difficult one to
appraise from a normative  point of view. Subtle trade-offs between schooling,
leisure ancd  poverty across generations  may  be involved. Hence, the paper
emphasises  welfare economics  issues pertaining of child labor.
Another  feature of  this study is that it seeks to survey not only the economic
research,  but also research  from  other social sciences,  particularly social
anthropology.  The social anthropological  studies deal  with an aspect of child
labor so tar less adequately dealt with  by economists - the relationship
between  their labor and their socialization;  how certain  types of labor and
edlucation  may give  rise to different preferences to the children  as  adults.
A  major,  but tentative  conclusion of this survey is  that the relationship
between  poverty and  child labor  is less close than normally  assumed in
the policy clebate.
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